Another voice
Necessary care and attention
Auberon Waugh
The case of Dr L.J.H. Arthur, the Derbyshire paediatrician who has been sent for trial at Nottingham Crown Court accused of murdering a three-day old mongol baby, is sub judice and II have no desire whatever to influence the court's deliberations, or the jury's verdict, when it comes to trial. My anxiety is sharpened in this case by the fact that his defending counsel, the brilliant George Carman QC, has already had one shot at sending me to prison for alleged contempt towards another court. On that occasion, Mr Carman was frustrated only by a vigilant Lord Chief Justice who has since, unfortnnately, retired. But I must stress that my interest in the charges against Dr Arthur is theological rather than legal; that I have no opinion about the merits of the legal case against him; and that I introduce the matter chiefly as a backdrop to discussion of another criminal case before Camberwell Green magistrates last week, which became known as the Case of the Suffering Goldfish. In fact, the implications of this second case are what chiefly concern me.
The facts of the first case have been set out thus: on 28 June last year a woman gave birth to a mongol son, John Pearson, at Derby City Hospital while Dr Arthur was on duty. The mother discharged herself next day and indicated no desire to look after the child, Dr Arthur is alleged to have prescribed a codeine syrup, frequently used as a mild sedative and cough suppressant, which has the side effect of depressing respiration. The baby died of pneumonia on 1 July a disease to which mongol children are in any case exceptionally prone. If the Crown is to secure a conviction, it will have to establish beyond reasonable doubt not only that the pneumonia was caused by the sedative but also that the sedative was administered with the deliberate intention of killing the child.
So much for the legal position. Any theological discussion of a case of this sort might be tempted to distinguish between primary intention and secondary effect, between a certain good and a possible ' mischief, between risks which must be avoided and those which there is less obligation to avoid, and even between a lesser evil and a higher benevolence, although this last one might be tricky.
But however exalted the plane on which we may choose to discuss this unhappy event, we may be certain that every saloon bar in Britain will be discussing it on a somewhat less exalted plane: whether or not it is OK for a doctor to bump off incurably subnormal babies at birth, in the event of nobody wanting them. Any such discussion must be removed from the particular circumstances of the charges against Dr Arthur because, of course, both the law and Christian theology are unequivocal on the point: it is not OK. But it wouldn't really surprise me if, when we had disentangled irrelevant points from the Grand Saloon Bar Debate about whether the parents should be punished and if so how, whether enforced sterilisation might not be the answer to everything, we arrived at a general consensus which held both Christian theology and the existing law in equal contempt.
Which is why I turn to the Case of the Suffering Goldfish in some alarm, for the light it throws not Only on the legal attitude to goldfish but also on our underlying social philosophy. This case is no longer sub judice so my comments on the prosecuting authority, the witnesses, the court's verdict and the magistrates who reached this monstrous verdict can be more or less unbridled.
The basis of the case is this. Mr Alan Garlinge, aged 23, bought a 11/2 inch goldfish from Mr H. Sanders of Coldharbour Lane, Brixton, for 50p. Examining the fish afterwards, he noticed it had an abscess on one side and complained to the RSPCA. The RSPCA prosecuted, producing as witness Mr Alan Hanson, a veterinary surgeon, who told the court: -The right course in a case like this would have been to dispatch the goldfish humanely. Unnecessary suffering has been caused by allowing the goldfish to continue living in that condition.' Magistrates, finding that he had caused the beast unnecessary suffering 'by omitting to provide necessary care and attention', conditionally discharged Mr Sanders for 12 months, ordering him to pay £60 costs.
This verdict seems open to criticism on grounds of law, of natural justice, of Christian morality and finally, perhaps most serious of all, on grounds of social philosophy. Let us first examine the legal aspects. In the famous case of R.V. Donaghy (Scotland) 1974, as I remember, it was found that Miss Eleanor Donaghy could not be guilty of cruelty to prawns by putting them on a hot plate and watching them jump around for the good reason that prawns were not animals and so did not qualify under the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912. Miss Donaghy, under cross-examination, rather felt that Scottish prawns were insects. So mutates mutandis (or, as the lawyers say, semble) must English goldfish be. A clever lawyer could have made kedgeree of the prosecution's case but Mr Sanders, in a letter to the court, pointed out that defending the summons would have cost him £150, which was CD° expensive for a goldfish. On the point of natural justice, I can onlY suggest that death is no less abhorrent to the animal creation that it is to human beings; the idea is repugnant to all natural observation that 'necessary care and attention can involve killing. Any concept of justice which relies on such a proposition must an abomination, at any rate from the poo of view of the animals it is designed t° protect. So to the morality which regulates the conduct of Christians towards brutes. This is best contained in the Summa Theologica 1, 1, 2, 3, 13, 75, 118 (fundamentalists eall turn to Exod. xx 10, xxiii 12; Deal. Ic4‘,1 4; xxii 6) and can be summed tip thus; animals have no duties, being destitute free will, ergo no rights. Brutes are made for man, who has the same rights over themas he has over plants and stones. He maY put them to death for his food, and this without strict necessity; ergo he may put that, Wr death or inflict pain on them for any goo' °i reasonable end, such as the promotion knowledge or health or even for the purposes of recreation, but with this limita. tion — that he must not take Pleasnce titt.,e, directly in the pain given to brutes, si this he degrades and brutalises his 1.11, nature and might transfer the cruelty to own kind. Nobody claimed that Mr Sanders derived pleasure from the suffering of his goldfish; so we must conclude that his negligence wti no offence against traditional Christian morality. Which brings me to the far More serious point of social philosophy. If theset laws against animal negligence are ll°tfl inspired by traditional morality, they be inspired by simple human kindfle" towards animals, that is to say bY empathetic (or, as some would say, sentimental) anthropomorphism. Allinha. suffering is repugnant to the extent that it reminds us of, or resembles, human feting. With that in mind, let us apply the rtili,tige of the Camberwell Green magistrates ill th", Case of the Suffering Goldfish to general problem of incurably abnorinae children — although not, of course, t° th particular case of John Pearson which bea".5 not the slightest resemblance. /vIongolis,cii, much more common than people re. affecting about one in 550 live births. wicaof than half of these die within the first Yeache their lives, usually from afflictions of tve heart or lungs. Most of those who survihe the represent a burden on community, a source of strain and arlxle.'„' to all around, even if a few extra0rdinar,117 unselfish people find fulfilment in after them. At the very least, I should gtlea'n that a mongol baby causes as much hill; b• distress as a thousand suffering gol,dling Am I being absurdly gloomy in wonoel' whether paediatricians may yet be m' e prose cuted for failing to provide the same 'necessary care and attention' as We vide, in our kindness, for suffering goldfish
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