MR. CHURCHILL AND SIR FREDERICK MAURICE.
[To the Editor of the SPECTATOR.]
Sift,—May I be allowed a word of protest against Sir Frederick Maurice's review of Mr. Churchill's book in your last issue ?
Before the War Mr. Churchill devoted a very large part of his life to the study of war : lie certainly had exceptional opportunities in this pursuit, both on active military service in several campaigns and during his period of administration as First Lord of the Admiralty. His studies early led him to the conclusion that the supreme strategic object in all warfare is the turning of the enemy's flanks. Even Sir Frederick Maurice admits that Mr. Churchill rendered at any rate ono inestimable service to the Empire : during the years before the powder magazine of Europe was fired, he prepared the most powerful and flexible weapon the world has ever seen
the Grand Fleet—and he saw to it that that Fleet was at sea when the hour struck.
The seas cleared of the enemy, he very properly directed his attention to the all-important consideration of flanks.
The question at once arose : To the Baltic or to the Dardanelles first? Mr. Churchill has clearly and frankly stated his reasons—military and political—for choosing the latter. He flung himself into his task with a rare and fir.e enthusiasm : again and again he was let down—I had almost
said betrayed—by i ') -oldiers, the sailors, and the politicians, with the solitary exceptions of Lan Hamilton and Keyes.
Undaunted, he fought on—a lone hand—attacked by all, while he saw the prize, of which he alone perhaps realiz,ed the full value, slip from his grasp through no fault of his own.
And, even so,.how nearly he succeeded ! Take any evidence you like—the evidence of the American AnThassador at Constantinople, Mr. Morgenthau ; the evidence of the German and Turkish military commanders themselves. All tell the same story : not once, but again and again the fate of Con- stantinople trembled in the balance. Success here meant victory ; a subsequent success in the Baltic might have saved Russia from herself and Europe from disintegration. For it must not be forgotten that the First Lord ardently supported the Baltic scheme and pressed on the construction of the Armada of 612 by every means in his power. On that terrible day when Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher left the Admiralty British naval prestige—Dardanelles or no Dardanelles—had never stood so high. The enemy had been swept from the seas and we controlled the situation. Two years later we reaped the reward of moral cowardice and lack of initiative begot by an effete and pusillanimous Admiralty administra- tion, when friend and foe alike regarded with incredulous astonishment and wonder the sorry spectacle of the greatest naval power in the world humbled on every sea, fighting not for a quick, decisive victory but desperately for existence ! The men had gone. Only officials remained.
When one considers what the feelings of Mr. Churchill must have been as he watched every proved maxim of war discarded, every chance of surprise and therefore of sudden, decisive victory flung to the winds, one can only marvel at the wonderful generosity revealed on every page of his book.
General Maurice quotes a paragraph from the most pregnant passage in the book—that which deals with the war of attrition in France : he -describes this passage as beastly and nauseating. Nevertheless, thousands of men and women to-day will endorse every word of it. Look at the condition of this country and of Europe I And reflect on the "bloody shambles" which, despite the warnings of Neuve Chapelle and Loos, began on the Somme in 1916 and continued without cessation until the Canal du Nord was crossed more than two years later. Thousands upon thousands of the best men in the world were sacrificed, while the tangible wealth of the world was blown away. Can any man then put his hand on his heart and say with truthfulness that those last two years were worth it—for this ?—I am, Sir, &c.,
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