AS I WAS SAYING
Why the Tory Eurosceptics do not ring true
PEREGRINE WORSTHORNE
If the Tories had won a majority, it would have been made up of Europhobes dedicat- ed to having Britain out of the European Union, or at best on its sidelines, in short order. From that fate at least Tony Blair's landslide victory has delivered us, which is very much more than a small mercy. Whether a chastened Tory party will take a deep breath and think again I do not know. But if they don't, it will be the Tory party, not a thousand years of British history, which will shortly be coming to an end.
What is required with great urgency is a recovery of common sense — the knack of looking at things with an unclouded eye. In the 1930s the Tory party put at risk its rep- utation in this respect by failing to see the obvious: that Nazi Germany's plans for Europe did indeed constitute a mortal threat to British independence. In the 1990s they are in danger of doing so again by failing to see something equally obvious: that democratic Germany's do not. Regula- tions emanating from Brussels are not at all the same as diktats emanating from Berlin; red tape not at all the same as barbed wire; sitting on Chancellor Kohl's knee not at all the same as being ground under Chancellor Hitler's foot. Sounding the tocsin as if it were otherwise, therefore, is inappropriate, indeed plain silly. Far from turning the British public against Europe, it only serves to turn them against Tories.
When will Eurosceptics recognise that their rhetoric about British independence and British sovereignty no longer rings quite true? On hearing them carry on in this way I feel the same kind of embarrass- ment as when hearing my old Stoic contem- poraries talk about our old school as if we were still there. Just as I am amazed that these old school chums of yesteryear have not grown up and noticed that in the wider world of adulthood school affairs are no longer at the centre of the universe, so am I amazed that the Eurosceptics have not grown up and realised that national affairs are no longer so central either.
It is not that threats to British indepen- dence are unworthy of concern. Of course they are worthy of concern, but not of such obsessive concern as to blot out other developments, as much at home as abroad, which put these dangers, such as they are, in a less apocalyptic light, indeed some- times in a positively rosy light. My fears, possibly imaginary, about what harm the European Union might do to Britain are kept in balance by my hope — which, of course, could also turn out imaginary — about what good it might do, not only to Britain but to mankind in general. Appre- hension tempered by enthusiasm; enthusi- asm tempered by apprehension: a pragmat- ic patriot, it seems to me, can honourably adopt either approach to the European Union, depending on the nature of the breezes blowing from Brussels on any par- ticular morning — but that is about as far as the bounds of common sense should allow him to waver.
I use the word apprehension advisedly, as the lawyers say. Fear would be far too strong. For once, that much quoted Frank- lin Roosevelt phrase about there being 'nothing to fear but fear itself seems bang on. A senior French Gaullist once explained why France felt so relaxed about Europe. 'Because we have the H-bomb and they [the Germans] do not,' he said, rather as white imperialists in the 19th century felt relaxed about the natives 'because we have the Maxim gun and they do not'. In the final analysis, as Mao put it, 'power grows out of the barrel of a gun'. So long as Britain and France maintain their indepen- dent nuclear deterrent, so long will these great historic nations maintain ultimate control over their own destinies. Belgium, Holland, even Italy might have cause to worry, but not Britain or France. In that crucial sense a future United States of Europe will be fundamentally dif- ferent from any previous federation, cer- tainly from the United States of America. Imagine what a different course American history would have taken if two of the origi- nal 13 states, Virginia or South Carolina, say, had possessed some equivalently deci- sive military preponderance not available to the federal government in Washington DC. New York state's financial primacy, symbolised by Wall Street, would always have enabled the North to hold its own. But the South, too, given that deterrent, would also have had its own guarantor of independence.
Imagine, too, how different the course of British history would have been if Scotland, at the Act of Union, had also enjoyed mili- tary preponderance. Possessing nuclear weapons would not be enough to guarantee Britain or France any kind of dominance in the United States of Europe. So much is obvious. But it should be equally obvious that so long as these two nation states pos- sess nuclear deterrents — and neither intends to give them up — Brussels won't be able, in any last resort, to impose its will on them.
In any case, historic nations are not so easily snuffed out. Look, for example, at Ukraine and Georgia today. Even after suf- fering 70 years of totalitarian rule from Moscow their sense of national identity has emerged unscathed. If their national identi- ties, and languages, so much less deeply rooted than those of Europe's great nation states, can survive intact a form of federa- tion incomparably more oppressive than anything even Christopher Booker suspects Brussels of wanting to impose, surely Britain and France do not need to worry over much about losing theirs.
Eventually the great European nation states may choose to merge their national identities. That possibility cannot be ruled out. But if they do, this will not be because of heavy-handedness from Brussels — which would be certain to have the oppo- site result — but because of a seductively light touch. The only way rule from Brus- sels could put an end to British indepen- dence would be by proving preferable to Westminster rule; by earning eager consent rather than coercing reluctant agreement. In other words, if Europhobia about Brus- sels were to prove justified, British inde- pendence will never be in danger, since a United States of Europe could not come to pass. It could only come to pass if Euro- phobic fears were to prove unfounded.
Having tried to dissipate imaginary fears about a United States of Europe, let me end by expressing what I believe to be a realistic hope: that it may eventually emerge as the great new political breakthrough of the 21st century, making the United States of America, now so ancient by comparison, look moth-eaten and old-fashioned. What a marvellous role reversal it would be to have Europe, rather than America, once again in the forefront of human progress. The other great development which the 21st century may hold in store is the emergence of China as a new Asian superpower. Were that to happen the United States of Europe might providentially come on stream none too soon, enabling the Old World to be called in to redress the balance of the New — just in time. Some apprehensions about the European Union are indeed in order, but enthusiasm in abundance makes for more common sense.
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