'Political Commentary
A shift in the balance of power
Patrick Cosgrave
The departure of the Americans from South Vietnam, long though it had been predicted, was a shock. It is often thus with political events which, however accurately foreseen, enjoy a special impact once they are achieved. Since, moreover, the final American withdrawal was accompanied by the announcement of an impending retreat from Thailand — under, apparently, some pressure from the Royal Thai government — it was also inevitable that the domino theory would be resuscitated. And the argument about international politics on the Asian periphery is suddenly once again as vivid and energetic, as between the proponents and opponents of the domino theory, as it was in the age of Eisenhower., Kennedy and Johnson. It is my purpose this week to attempt a valuation of the argument on both sides; and to make some special reference to the consequences of British, as well as American, withdrawal from Asia.
There can be no doubt that the influence of the West, and especially of the L.Lnited States, has been materially damaged by the defeat in Vietnam. The manner of the American conduct of the war, and the special brutality of American soldiery, which aided the corrosion both of the domestic will in the United States and that of their allies in South Vietnam, is irrelevant to that conclusion. Writing ten years ago in this paper I argued that the United States should have made a stand in South-East Asia — but not in Vietnam. Even when they stood in Vietnam they could have won, had they really heeded the advice of Sir Robert Thompson; something that was impossible because of the inability of American troops, trained and cushioned as they were, to fight the kind of brilliant campaign which Sir Robert and Sir Gerald Templer had waged in Malaysia. There is no reason, supposing America's will to defend her interests has not altogether died, why the United States could not stand on a different line in Asia even yet; but her prestige is now so damaged that she is unlikely to be asked to. So the damage to her and our influence may well be irreparable.
It does not follow that the domino theory, at least in its most simple and definite form, is validated. Behind the formulation of that theory lay a mental comparison between the role of China in Asia and that of Russia in Europe. In its-original form, domino theory assumed that the consequence of American defeat would be the rise of a triumphant Communist China, manipulating the puppets to the south of her. But Asia is not, of course, Europe; and China exercises over her satellites nothing like the command that Russia exercises over hers. She represents, even now, nothing like the threat to the West that Russia represents; and seems bent on strengthening.
There is no single focus of Communism in Asia, while there is one in Europe. Consequently China represents nothing like the same threat to, say, Malaysia, that Russia does to, say, Britain. However, it does not follow that the opponents of the domino theory are therefore correct in their assumption that a Communist victory in Vietnam means nothing in particular for the states of the further South-East Asian periphery. For the victorious Communist Vietnamese could easily constitute a threat in themselves and. quite independently, mount and finance operations of war against Thailand or Malaysia or Burma. Indeed, the first assumption that must be made about South-East Asia is that Vietnam is now the dominant military power in the region, and enjoys besides the particular prestige of having defeated, not a major power merely, but a super-power. The diplomatic moves of the independent South-East Asian powers in the last few days have all been directed towards making an accommodation with Vietnam, not with China.
If China is herself to expand further-in Asia it is likely to be in Taiwan; and there may come a moment in the future when she wishes to expand in India. But the new Vietnam remains a threat to the other countries of the South. There is a law of international politics here, which should be sufficient to dispose of the objections of those who see the Vietnamese spending the next decade on reconstruction. It runs like this: even if the government of a power is saintly in disposition, it inevitably expands where it meets no resistance. And the Vietnamese, having taken everything the Americans could throw at them and shrugged it off, have demonstrated an iron frugality that may well enable them to take reconstruction and further conquest in their stride; even if
that conquest masquerades in the first instance as mere financial and other support for the guerrilla movements in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.
The other South-East Asian countries have therefore, in the last few days, behaved as foolishly towards the Americans as have the countries of Western Europe: instead of trying to succour their great ally in her hour of humiliation, in the full realisation that on her and her alone their independence ultimately depends, they have furthered her sense of loss by seeking to placate the victor. The Vietnamese would be foolish indeed — they would be less than human — if they did not sense their new power.
Of course, some South-East Asian politicians — and especially Mr Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore — have always resisted too much American involvement in their affairs. Their reasoning, too, has been simple and intelligent. America is so powerful — so their argument runs — militarily, economically and culturally,
that to involve her too deeply in one's affairs invites the risk of being wholly digested by her, however pure her motives and intentions. For that reason Mr Lee fought hard against a British withdrawal from Asia; especially since he remembered that the British are the only Western power this century wholly to defeat a guerrilla movement supplied from an outside base. (Actually we did it twice, once in Malaysia, and once in Indonesia.) After the last Labour government welshed (despite hugely romantic professions) on its undertakings in South-East Asia Mr Heath, showing immense courage and vision (and against the apathy of many in his own party) rebuilt the Asian Commonwealth alliance; only to see his positions wrecked by irresponsible Labour governments in Australia, New Zealand and Britain. It was as tragic a moment for the West — though it passed almost unnoticed — when Mr Heath's alliance broke up, as it was when the Americans pulled out of Vietnam.
The reasoning behind what may seem a disproportionate comparison is as follows. All middle and small powers depend on great ones for their ultimate protection. But in modern times the middle and smaller powers tend to fear the embrace of their friends almost as much as the clutch of their foes — for the same reasons as Mr Lee. Five years ago it seemed that the smaller Western powers were beginning to draw together in mutually Protective alliances, under the overall protection of the United States, to sustain their individual and collective interests. Had the world Mr Heath envisaged developed, our great ally would merely have held the ring, so that Russia, the great ally of the smaller powers on the other side, could not too grossly interfere. Such a world is almost unimaginable now.
Almost everybody recognises the potential consequences of the American defeat, at least in areas other than Asia. Under Dr Kissinger's pernicious influence President Ford is in the process of administering a complicated snub to Israel. And the West is now so purblind that they are likely to grasp the terrible blow to their interests that an Israeli defeat would involve only if that gallant country goes under. (Indeed, only the Israelis among Western powers have any hope of again altering the world balance of power; and that by defeating the Arabs conclusively in another war.) Of course, the Europeans, too, may well soon feel the chill of Congressional pressure to reduce American troop levels in our sub-continent.
It is important to remember, however, when considering the world context of these events, that Vietnam is more Russia's ally than China's. Even at the height of the disagreement between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic, Russian munitions trains were allowed to cross China to Vietnam, and that bespeaks a degree of continuity of Communist interest between Communist powers that we have almost forgotten existed. What we may well now be seeing is the development of a Communist bloc on a much looser basis than we — with the European model in mind are inclined to imagine. The Russian expansion of military effort has continued unabated, in spite of the requirements of so-called detente: the Russians are in Somalia and in India, and their prestige now stands higher in Asia than for many a day. With the opening of the Suez Canal their ships will enjoy much speedier passage around the world than at any time since the Suez debacle, and at a moment when the United States is drawing in her horns and Britain and the European Powers have virtually abdicated their responsibilities even to themselves.
The world balance of power is undergoing a major shift and, even though the new system being created may be much looser than we have feared in the past, and even though hostility between Russia and China may continue, the shift is all in favour of the Communists.
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