Thunder on the Right
By ANTHONY HARTLEY rr wo new studies of French politics under de I Gaulle* have appeared, both of a very high standard—though not always very excitingly written---and though they approach the subject from slightly divergent points of view (right centre and left centre) they come to strikingly similar conclusions. Both note the increasing atrophy of political life in France, and the urgent need of reaching an Algerian settlement. To remedy the one and achieve the other, however, is more easily advised than done; for all the activity which might bring some life into French political life seems to come from the Right, under- taken (where it is not a rearguard action by the alcohol lobby) in defence of l'Algerie In fact, apart from a joyous resurgence of anti-clericalism over the schools question, the most significant political developments since May 13 recorded by Messrs. Williams and Harri- son are those which, inside the Union pour la Nouvelle Republique (UNR), opposed MM. Neuwirth and Chalandon to MM. Soustelle and Delbecque, who wished the party to come out for the integration of Algeria with Metropolitan France. In this debate the most decisive argument used by the liberals was that of fidelity to Presi- dent de Gaulle. As M. Chalandon put it, 'it is our task to be purely and simply Gaullists, and not to seek to embrace the General the better to smother him.' No doubt, this was an effective style to use before a party congress of the UNR, but, from the point of view of French demo- cracy,' it had the disadvantage of resting the entire case against integration on an appeal to * DE GAULLE'S REPUBLIC. By Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison. (Longmans, 25s.) THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC. By Dorothy M. Pickles. (Methuen, 15s.) Cesar. It smothered an attack on President de Gaulle's policies, but did it in such a way that it created a void.
Yet, perhaps, this was inevitable. To prevent the UNR bolting for Algerie francaise was a con- siderable feat, and it might not have been pos- sible in any other way. In the absence of a vigorous and reconstructed French Left, was there any other course open to the President than the assertion of his personal authority against Right-wing extremists? For, when he is accused of being responsible for the political silence which reigns over France, it should not be for- gotten that this silence comes in large part from his having blocked the demands of the revolu- tionary Right on the most burning question of the day : Algeria. Since May, 1958, the French Left has been in pitiable confusion, sheltered by the President from the consequences of its debacle. It is on the Right that voices have been raised and rendered silent or impotent by the Voice from the Elysde.
All this is to say that the ultimate justification of President de Gaulle's suspension of republican political life in favour of what is more or less a presidential regime will be his finding of a real solution to the Algerian problem. That problem is so urgent and so potentially disruptive of French life that, once the normal processes of parliamentary democracy had broken down in the attempt to solve it, a good deal could be tolerated from a man prepared to cut the Gor- dian knot. What de Gaulle's ultimate views on the subject are remains a little obscure. His policy in black Africa (prepared by M. Mitterand under the Fourth Republic) has been remarkable for its liberalism. In Algeria itself it is hard to perceive any sense in the President's steady attempt to get rid of Right-wing conspira- tors and political generals culminating in (hest; pression of the 'ultra' putsch last January, u1116 he were contemplating a policy which gave sr satisfaction to Moslem nationalism. For 111° reasons I believe his line in Algeria to be lih‘fi and certainly not colonialist.
However, it is quite evident that Paris is ° less in control of events in North Africa t might appear on the surface. Or rather the Pie)] dent is only in control of them up to the where he can carry the army with him. IP wavering on the part of certain units It' January was one of the most significant feahlI:' of the Ortiz/Lagaillarde revolt, and may N., been the cause of the notorious tournee 0:1 popotes which seemed to make nonsense of nItl_„, of de Gaulle's previous policy. In many resP; the French army (and especially its chiefs) his, vested interest in the continuance of the Alge(i'" war. Commanding a garrison in Toulouse '5 Soissons is small beer when compared to ing a campaign in North Africa, quite apart ti considerations of military prestige and the '11‘, directed idealism which leads many yours;' , officers to believe in the necessity of continue' French rule in Algeria. President de Gaulle justly be accused of showing too much consider]l tion for the feelings of the army, but, given it: state of mind, any government would be b.)811' to pay some attention to the opinions of a lar` which has so recently successfully defied 111' civil authorities The restoration of the power of the State el mised by the Fifth Republic remains both parli3 and fragile, and will continue to do so as iLln as there is no coherent political movement Metropolitan . France to counter-balance 11' power of the army in North Africa. It is this Ih': makes the reappearance of a democratic frenc' Left of such importance, but at the moment thee' is no sign of any such development. The sir. tion of the French working classes as a poiii force by a bureaucratically Stalinist Co:111)1nm' Party. has left no soil for any Left-wing illass movement to take root in, and the other politics' parties present the mere splinters of a i.cpt//i/igol des camerade.v. The void around de Gaulle essentially the lack of a Left, and it is not to be filled by decree or referendum. Lacking all stir port other than his own personal authority. 11" can conjure some results out of the air, but all) basis for a determination of policy without reference to the army is lacking. The damage of May 13 has been done, and it will be a long joie before the army is a reliable instrument in the hands of the French State—above all for lhe execution of that essential task : the granting of Algerian independence after negotiations will) the FLN.
Everything, in fact, has conspired to hide the gravity of the Algerian situation: the need 10 soothe the army as well as economic prosperity' And it may be questioned whether, in these Cif', cumstances, President de Gaulle's 'wait and sec policy has sufficient force of shock to create a body of opinion determined to find a political solution to the Algerian problem and to carry' through such a solution in face of opposition from army and colons. On this will depend the future of the Fifth Republic, and it is by his success or failure in this domain that President de Gaulle too will be judged.
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