BOOKS.

VON MO LTILE'S EIISSIA.N CAMPAIGNS IN TURKEY,

182 8 -'2 9.*

,k TRANSLATION of Moltke's history of the Russian campaigns of 1828-'29 may seem to be late in the day ; since not only has Colo- nel Chesney recently published a critical military account of the same event, and Sir Archibald Alison written an historical narra- tive in more rhetorical style, but the soldier to a considerable ex- tent, the historian very greatly indeed, have been indebted to the Prussian officer both for their facts and their opinions. Those, how- ever, whom a professional feeling, or a desire for thorough knowledge of the campaigns in question, may induce to study the subject for themselves, will find this volume an indispensable companion. In the first place, no compilation, however skilful, can ever supersede original authorities or convey the same impressions to the mind ; and though a great genius may convey results or conclusions truer than the reader could form for himself, it must be by authority, not evidence. In the second place, the fulness both of topics and of facts in Baron von Moltke's work exhibits the whole subject more com- pletely; his position as a military representative of Prussia at the Porte gave him means of information which add weight to his opinions. Yet full and minute as is the book, nothing is dry save the technicalities of sieges, and they only to unprofessional readers. The European politics preliminary to the war, and the disorganized condition of Turkey through the Greek insurrection, the battle of Navarino, and the destruction of the Janissaries, are briefly sketch- ed at starting. The physical features and condition of the countries invaded, especially in reference to military operations, are minutely but graphically described; every military event is narrated com- pletely, and then subjected to critical remarks; criticism on a broader scale being applied to each campaign and to the whole of the war. The reader has thus ample means of forming a judgment as to this particular war, as well as to the prospects of any future war by the same parties under circumstances somewhat similar.

The inevitable conclusions are—first, that if the Turkish force were well led and well commanded either on the old national or the modern European system, Russia is really not strong enough for the task of reducing Turkey, especially without the command of the Black Sea; second, that the causes of Russian influence and Russian success are secrecy, mendacity, and imposture. In the first campaign of 1828, such was the scantiness of their forces in comparison to the undertaking, and the mismanagement of what force they had, that they must have retreated across the Danube at the close of the autumn, but for the fall of Varna, brought about by treachery. Of this treachery Von Moltke en- tertains not a doubt, however natural may have been the conduct of hissuf Pasha, who was treated ungratefully by the Porte and threatened with destruction while gallantly defending Varna. Even as it was, Varna could have been relieved had Omar Vrione followed up his success against Prince Eugene : the failure arose from want of instant activity, and ignorance of the true principles of war. All the successes were obtained, with one exception, by panic or treachery.

1. The passage of the Danube was successfully effected through the cowardice and misconduct of the Turks ; but in a place, the Dobrud- ache, where, in Moltke's opinion, the passage should not have been attempted.

2. Isakchi surrendered in a panic.

3. Matchin surrendered in a weak if not a cowardly manner.

4. Varna from treachery. 5. Brailow surrendered, after a most gallant defence, justifiably as regards the state of the defences, but still from a superstition among the Turkish soldiers that the place would be blown up bit by bit.

6. Hirsowa, Tultcha, and Kostendje, all surrendered in panic, on the fall of Brailow.

In short, wherever the Russians were boldly and honestly re- sisted, either they were beaten, or they succeeded only after long delay and fearful loss. The army on the right bank of the Danube might probably have been destroyed in its scattered winter-quar- ters by an enterprising enemy.

Diebitsch, appointed to the command in 1829, opened the cam- paign with the great advantage over his predecessor that he was unfettered by the Emperor and his band of diplomatists, who had all gone back to Russia. To his able conduct of the campaign Moltke bears ample testimony. The final strategy of dividing his forces, leaving the Turkish army behind him at Shumla, and push- mg on with reduced numbers across the Balkan to Adrianople, was a desperate necessity to avoid failure ; for the reinforce- ments he had received were not equal to his requirements, and did not more than supply the losses of the previous campaign. If audacity means, not the conquest of difficulties by extreme bold- ness and disregard of threatening risks, but mendacious imposition supported by systematic arts, then the passage of the Balkan was audacious; but had the Porte or the foreign diplomatists at Con- stantinople taken means to obtain proper information, not only must the army with Diebitsch have surrendered or been destroyed, but the like fate must have overtaken the forces between the Balkan and the Danube unless they had fled. Diebitsch reached Adrianople with 20,000 men ; the Porte and the foreign ambassa- dors believed he had 60,000! In fact, the practical conclusion from the whole is, that in preparing to meet Russia in the field, regard May be properly had to reports of Russian strength ; but in * The Russians in Bulgaria and Rnmelia in 1828 and 1829, during the Campaigns Of the Danube, the Sieges of Brailow, Varna, Silistria, Shumla, and the Passage of the Balkan by Marshal Diebitsch. From the German of Baron von Moltke, Major in the Prussian Service. Published by Murray. diplomacy no consideration should be paid to anything but our own objects, which should be maintained I Poutrance.

For present purposes, the appendix is perhaps the most valuable part of 'Von Moltke's volume. It relates to the medical condition of the Russian troops, and their losses by disease in the two cam- paigns. The occurrence of the plague has certainly been less fre- quent of late years. It is therefore probable that none of the armies may suffer from it now. If the Allies, when en- gaged in the unhealthy lowlands of the Danube, should make short work of the enemy, they may escape the usual diseases of the country altogether. Still it is well to look the worst evil in the face, either with the view of avoiding or meeting it. The superior diet of the English and French troops, by giving the men better stamina, may enable them more effectually to re- sist disease, and, aided by precautions, to avert it. Whether the English are so amenable to control as the Russians, or, up to a cer- tain point, 'so well fitted to endure privations, may be doubtful. It is quite clear that the English system of recruiting, and the public of this country, would not bear the same losses as Russia, whose soldiers perish by myriads, unchronicled and uncared-for. The same remark may be applied to France, though perhaps in a lesser degree. Hygiene becomes a matter of the first importance. Precau- tion, however, can only check or modify, it cannot overcome climate. The coasts of the Black Sea and the valley of the Danube are dis- tinguished for a malaria that produces diarrhcea, intermittent fever, and other local complaints, more especially in the warm weather. We know not that the following remarks of Moltke, on the pro- bable means of maintaining health in Turkey, are of much practi- cal utility ; because a soldier must work, must be exposed, and cannot pick his own hours for either ; while he may be glad to eat what he can get. To a commander who is something more than a soldier, the passage might furnish hints for general con- sideration.

"We know of old that armies which took the field in Dacia and Pannonia have always been visited by pestilence, although the country cannot be said to be unhealthy to the inhabitants, whose clothing, diet, and habits are fitted to the climate. In this part of Turkey, as in all others, no such thing is known as really hard labour. The life of an Oriental is simple and tran- quil: he rises early, eats his first meal at nine o'clock, sits during the heat of the day under a vine-clad trellis or a plane-tree, drinks sherbet, and tastes no stimulant more powerful than coffee and a pipe ; towards sunset he eats another frugal meal of vegetables, and goes to bed so early that in a Turkish village no one is seen out of doors after eight o'clock. As soon as the great heats begin, usually in May, epidemic fevers frequently break out even among the natives ; who then go into a sort of voluntary quarantine in their summer-houses, or up into the mountains. By the middle of July the spring fevers usually subside,. owing to the want of communication; for the

are almost empty during that time, and there are towns in Asia Minor, ma, for instance Malatia, where in summer not a soul is to be seen—the 20,000 or 30,000 inhabitants having removed to their summer quarters several miles off by the side of flowing streams, and beneath the cool shade of trees. The whole Kurdish and Turkoman population pass the summer under tents of goat's hair, and remove higher up the mountains in proportion to the in- crease of the heat.

"The clothing of the natives is as well adapted to the climate as their food and dwellings.. They never go uncovered, but protect their heads by a thick covering against the dangerous stroke of the sun. Furs, which in our Northern climate are so seldom used, are there worn by every one ; a tem- perature of 70', so refreshing to us after sunset, is there felt as intense cold after a heat of from 90 to 108' in the shade, and very warm clothing be- comes indispensable. Moreover, on the North of the Balkan no sooner has the short twilight begun than a dew falls which wets the clothes and bedding of those who sleep in the open air like a heavy rain."

The following passage describes the intermittent fever which ap- peared in Diebitsch's army as soon as he crossed the Balkan, in the very flush of hope and success, when diseases usually disappear. It

is possible, however, that the disease might be in the men, from

previous fatigue and privation' the change merely developing it. Aides, the opening scene, is not a very great distance from Varna.

"At the Southern foot of the mountain the troops rested from their long fatigues and privations, beneath the shade of fine oaks and beeches, and amid gardens affording vegetables and half-ripe grapes. The soldiers were re- joiced and encouraged by their successful passage of the Balkan, and were filled with fresh life and hope. Only about fifty men had been wounded at the taking of Aides, and there were not one hundred sick in the town. In Aidos, the streets had to be cleared of the dead bodies of the besieged, and the houses to be cleansed from dirt. No symptom of plague showed itself here, but the army was now attacked by intermittent fevers. In a very few days both officers and men complained of inconceivable languor and fatigue, inso- much that many of them could scarcely walk. Besides the intermittent, they were attacked by continued fever, accompanied by delirium, and such re- laxation of the capillaries, that the slightest blow, or even touch, caused blue marks in the akin; the bite of the flies, which attacked these patients with especial avidity, produced purple spots half an inch in diameter, in a few moments. On the fifth or sixth day, the patients died in a state of un- consciousness, and their bodies immediately began to decompose like those of hunted animals. The intermittent fevers, with redoubled paroxysms, ren- dered the patients weary of life, and were worse than the plague. Vary few had been wounded, but these were attacked by tetanus : more than half the number of deaths, however, were caused by dysentery. "Every day hundreds left the ranks of the arm.y, already so much en- feebled; some lost their senses for thirty-six hours in the paroxysms of fe- ver, others were perishing of thirst. The hospitals on the further side of the Balkan filled so fast that there was neither room to receive the sick nor clothes and linen for their use. Most of the necessaries had been left behind in Bulgaria ; where, during the month of July alone, 19,000 sick had been added to the 18,000 who had been left there. Thus, during the month of July no less than 40,000 men, more than half the active force of the army, lay in hospital."

When the army reached Adrianople, and while it remained there, matters got worse.

"At Adrianople an hospital was established in the newly-erected Turkish barracks, a large square building, standing on a height to the West of the town. The building consisted of two stories, with a hundred windows on each of the shorter fronts and a hundred and fifty on the longer ones. It contained a mosque with a tall minaret, large marble baths, spacious kitchens,

and a kiosk commanding a magnificent view of the town in the valley be- neath. In front extended a large green, a grove of plane-trees, and several gardens and cemeteries. An invading army might be considered fortunate in finding such quarters for their sick in this country ; but, owing to the probability of being soon forced to return home, the needful arrangements were made in the most temporary manner. We have already seen how long the stay of the Russians at Adrianople was protracted, and during three whole months they made shift as though they were to leave it at the end of three days : they were not prepared either for the enormous increase in the number of sick or for the rigour of the winter. The hospital filled fast : by the time the army had been in Adrianople a week 1616 sick were taken there; by the let of September it contained 3666, and by the middle of the month 4641, one-fourth of the whole remaining disposabfe force. • • * "To these immense numbers of sick nothing could be afforded but a bare shelter. Adrianople did not contain a supply of stores sufficient to last any length of time; the most ordinary food was wanting ; there was not even hay or straw to litter down the sick upon the wooden pallets of the barracks; they were laid upon torn-up Turkish tents, with knapsacks as pillows, and no covering but their cloaks. The winter set in with fearful severity ; most of the windows were unglazed, and the deers would not shut. In a short time the beautiful grove of plane-trees had disappeared ; for even the healthy troops wanted firewood, and the very bones of the dead out of the cemeteries were used as fuel. At first there was no lack of surgeons, but the work they had to do was beyond human powers ; there were no dressers to be found at all, and scarcely any hospital attendants. The doctors were forced to prepare and administer their remedies themselves; and when the plague broke out they nearly all fell victims to it, as was the case wherever it prevailed. • •

"Such an extraordinary state of health, or rather of sickness, could not have been foreseen ; it far exceeded all calculation; and it is difficult to form a conception of an army engaged in offensive operations of which the larger half is lying sick in the hospitals. The blame which has been cast upon the higher branches of military administration in this respect appears to us unjust ; it was manifestly impossible in such a country to carry the means and appliances for nursing and curing 40,000 sick, or to enforce during a cam- paign the quarantine regulations necessary in a time of plague. But such a state of things as that which we have just described must not be left out of our calculations in forming an opinion as to the performances of an army and its leaders.

"The Russian soldier would seem to be as patient and enduring under hardship, fatigue, privation, and suffering as he is brave in the moment of danger. Is far as the commander is concerned, it was the bard fate of Prince Sabalkanski to be opposed in each of the two campaigns in which he com- manded, not only by the armed foe, but by a secret and fatal enemy—in Tur- key by the plague, and in Poland by the cholera, to which he himself at length fell a victim. Not to mention the diminution in the material forces at his command, it requires boundless strength of purpose in the leader of an army, while witnessing such terrible and- widespread suffering, not to lose sight of the final object, which cannot be attained by waiting or temporizing, bat only by incessant vigour and rapid action.

"With regard to the campaign in Turkey, we think that history will say thus much in praise of General Diebitsch. He undertook nothing with the inadequate means at his command but what was indispensable for the at- tainment of his object. He besieged one fortress and fought one battle, but this brought him into the very heart of the hostile empire. He arrived there followed by the shadow of an army, but with the reputation of irresistible success. To the sagacious, bold, and prudent conduct of General Diebitsch at Adrianople, Russia owes the fortunate issue of a campaign which would have led to far different results if the Sultan and the European diplomatists had been at all aware of the real state of things."