SIR IAN HAMILTON'S DESPATCH.
THE despatch from Sir Ian Hamilton which was pub- lished in the papers of 'Wednesday leaves the reader in no doubt that the Dardanelles campaign is one of the most difficult operations of war ever undertaken by an army. We have tried, and are still trying, to take by assault positions which may be compared with Gibraltar, the fortified walls of Heligoland, the ancient Roman Capitol, or any other famous fortified place of which the very name stands for impregnability. Although Sir Ian Hamilton does not, of course, discuss the changing policy which has governed our adventure at the Dardanelles by sea and laud, oven his despatch cannot avoid making us acutely conscious of the light-hearted, fumbling methods by which we gradually became engaged in a major campaign. The Dardanelles affair is a war in itself —much more exacting and complicated than many wars in the past which have made the names of British generals and regiments immortal. If the policy which has governed this war is not creditable to our foresight and sagacity, the tale of devoted bravery and unfailing resource which Sir Ian Hamilton unfolds makes us forget much that is dis- quieting in sheer wonder and admiration. Words of praise become almost impertinent before such deeds—deeds performed not by well-trained regiments, but for the most part by recently improvised troops, and by the splendid fellows from Australia and New Zealand, who proved that the free life of their countries makes men half soldiers by occupation even before they begin to form fours or learn how to sight a Service rifle. What conclusion can we come to except that, even if policy should again err— which we do not apprehend—the same gallantry and resource will pull our men through ? There is now no possibility of looking back. Wo shall go ahead. We shall reach Constautinople.
When the Government had recognized that our ships unsupported by troops could not force their way through the Narrows, Sir Ian Hamilton's army was sent out. The General himself arrived in advance of his Staff, and he watched the last effort of the ships to "make good" with- out land support. Why this effort was undertaken we do not understand, but no doubt wo shall learn in time. Every one knows the result. On March 18th—the day after Sir Ian Hamilton's arrival—two British battleships and one French battleship were lost. There was no longer the least question of trying to go on without land support. Meanwhile two things had become clear. One was that the lauding on the Gallipoli Peninsula would be so difficult, owing to the extraordinarily confused nature of the ground and the easily defensible qualities of the enemy'. positions, that the whole of Sir Ian Hamilton's force must be involved in the attempt, and must be able to be thrown ashore in as short a time as possible. A prolonged landing meant certain ruin. But the transports had not been loaded with a view to such a lightning operation as this. A rearrangement was essential. Therefore the transports were sent back to Egypt to redis- tribute the men and material. The other thing which had become clear was that the unsuccessful attempts of the ships of war to force the Narrows had warned the Turks and their German officers what they must expect by land. Sir Ian Hamilton was able to see their preparations through a telescope ; adequate recon- naissance was impossible in the circumstances ; but he knew that the German-inspired enemy had not wasted their time. It was most unfortunate that the enemy should have been thus warned, but it was useless to repine and reflect what might have happened if a combined swoop had originally been made by land and sea. Sir Lan Hamilton set to work with a will to prepare his lightning landing. Even then the redistribution in Egypt occupied a month—another period most valuable to the enemy, we may be sure, who had already seen or heard of the transports when they first arrived off Tenedos. Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch carries events up to May 4th. The landing took place on April 25th. When we read of the difficulties we gasp with astonishment that it should have been accomplished at all. One of the most important morals is that an army which is determined to land on a hostile shore can do so, whatever the opposition. It may be driven into the sea later ; it may be annihilated ; but it will nevertheless land. Landings were effected on five beaches at the point of the Peninsula, and there was also the landing of the Australians and New Zealanders in the western bight.
Every man, woman, and child ought to read the story of these landings, and remember always as he reads that the vast majority of the troops—the Naval Division, the Territorials, and the Australians and New Zealanders, even the 29th Division, which has made an imperishable name for itself—had not had much training for war. We cannot follow all the incidents, and must barely refer to the device by which the collier' River Clyde' was run on to the beach and a bridge of pontoons was precariously made in a racing current; to the unforget- table tenacity of the King's Own Scottish Borderers in front of Krithia ; to the assault of Sedd-el-Bahr by troops who were exhausted and almost shattered after landing under a withering fire ; to the charge of the Australians at Raba Tape ' • and to the amazing coolness of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who approached the Turkish trenches at Tekke Burnu in open boats under a terrible fire and took them. " Lancashire Landing " is a name which will take its place in geography. Sir Ian Hamilton says of the success of the Lancashire Fusiliers that " no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier, or any other soldier." In the ten days of which Sir Ian Hamilton writes our losses were 177 officers and 1,990 other ranks killed ; 412 officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded ; and 13 officers and 3,580 other ranks missing. Since then, of course, we have learned that the casualties up to May 31st amounted to 38,636. The village of Krithia remains to be taken, and one may select Sir Ian Hamilton's account of the first effort to storm it on April 28th as an example of the irony of our policy of having given the enemy too much warning. " Had it been possible," he says, " toimsh in reinforcements in men, artillery, and munitions during the day, Krithia should have fallen and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided." In other words, Krithia nearly fell as it was. It would almost certainly have fallen if the attack had been unexpected. Many errors have still to be paid for, but we do not doubt the end. Such troops as those who lauded will not be denied.
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