MACDOUGALL'S THEORY OP WAR. * Tans volume by the "Superintendent of

Studies at the Royal Military College" is one of the results of the disputes and discussions which attended the Crimean campaign, and of the demand for highly-educated officers which accompanied the controversy. That a man who undertakes any business should be competently trained to it, is a self-evident proposition. It may be suspected that some of the clamour was of the unreasoning kind, which nowadays seems to conceive that everything may be attained by a set of well-concerted formalities, that shall dispense with all living attention, choice, and superintendence. Nor must it be forgotten that war in its actual exercise is a state of physical violence ; to be directed, no doubt, by intelligence, but the large mass of men exert if not exactly brute force, yet physical force. Great activity, promptness in personal resource, readiness to grapple with an antagonist, power of undergoing fatigue, and skill in all the exercises whether of gymnastics or of war, are the qualities which go to make the fighting soldier. These qualities rarely coexist with aptitude for higher studies, but they are of more use in the great mass of an army than accomplished scholarship, or mathematical acquireruents, or even an acquaintance with military literature. Now such qualities are best formed by field-sports, aquatic exercises, gymnastics, and even the more cruel or dangerous pursuits of steeplechases, &c. It is the rarity of the temperament which combines this physical power with aptitude for sustained study that renders great generals so rare an article. The same remark, though in a much less degree, applies to secondary commanders, and even to staff-officers. These last, indeed, require more activity, dash, and readiness, than regimental officers, who generally act as portions of a mass, while, unless the staff are to be considered mere message-carriers, they require a considerable knowledge of what may be termed the theory of war. To require in the Oi rroX.X0i of an army any very high preliminary attainments, seems an ill-judged thing. It will keep out many capital physical-force men who serve to maintain its condition, and let in a good many others who from deficient strength mid constitutional stamina would never make good officers of the higher class.

"Many men who are first-rate officers have not that peculiar structure of the brain which favours mathematical excellence. A certain organization of the nervous system is quite as essential to the formation of a good officer as that of the brain. Without the first, the possessor of the greatest intellect would doubtless become, if he chose, an admirable general in his closet; he might be an excellent war minister ; he would never make a general in the field, or be worth his pay as a soldier of any rank. "If it be desirable, as doubtless it is, that we should have officers capable from their scientific attainments of conducting delicate geodetical observations, let us follow the example of the French and have a separate topographical branch of the staff, composed of scientific men. "There are brilliant exceptions; it will be found, as a general rule, that the minds of such officers parake more of the abstract than the practical, and that they would be snore usefully employed in conducting those observations than in ranging a division in order of battle. Their gifts are different."

The conclusion would therefore seem to be, that while the test on admission should be slight as regards those scientific or literary acquirements which can be turned to military account, that test should go on continually increasing as the officer rises to command or to posts of administration or confidence. The system our author suggests is not preliminary examination at all, but preliminary training..

"This might be effected by obliging all officers before appointment to pass six or eight months at a central military school, where they should receive practical instruction in field fortification, surveying, out-poet duty, reconnoitering, &c.; all based, however, on a good elementary teaching of the theory of the art of war, commonly called 'Strategy and lacing.'"

The object of Colonel Maedougall's volume is to give such a

* The Theory of War : Illustrated by numerous Examples from Military History. By Lieut.-Col. P. L. Macdougall, Superintendent of Studies at the Royal Military College. Published by Longman and CC,.

view of strategy and tactics as shall serve as a class-book for his proposed training-school. It is, however, quite independent— quite capable of being used by any officer, or for that matter by any amateur who wishes to acquire a knowledge of the general principles of war, the interior divisions and economy of an army, and the considerations, sanitary, Moral, and Military, which must be present to the mind of a commander. The economical descriptions are brief and dogmatic ; the military principles briefly enunciated, but illustrated by historical examples, or by reference to current facts. The following is from the sections on training to march and the weight carried by the soldier.

"The rate at which an army is in the habit of marching without overfatigue depends on the bodily health and strength of the men composing it, and not only on those qualities, but also most particularly on the degree in which their powers of marching have been exercised and increased by constant practice or training.' Napoleon said that if two armies were equal in all things except numbers and rates of marching, their relative values would be found, not by comparing their numbers, but by comparing the products of their numbers and rates.

" The equipment of the soldier is closely connected with his powers of marching with reference to the weight he carries. That weight must be reduced to a minimum, regard being had to perfect efficiency. The greater the reduction of all unnecessary weight in arms, accoutrements, and general equipment, the greater the margin left for the carriage of his provisions by the soldier. The French soldier in heavy marching order, with his piece of art' tent and his provisions, carries about sixty-eight lb. : 'but he is a marching animal, which the English soldier, from want of training, is not. On the Kertch expedition, in the eleven miles' march from the landing-place to Yenikale, our men fell out by sections—the French did the same ; ours, however, from fatigue—the French to pillage ; and the same little men with their big loads were soon to be seen going to the front at a run, with the voluntary addition to their burdens of poultry, baskets, and even in some instances looking-glasses or pictures.

"The French soldier frequently carries eight days' rations—ours seldom more than three : with a large army what an important difference in the amount of transport required by the two ! and how many operations become possible in the one ease which are not so in the other ! But in laying down rules for armies of different nations, the characteristics and habits of the men composing them must not be lost sight of. The sort of food the French can work upon for eight days would not probably: suit the English.

"The French soldier is kept in constant training, but he is overweighted, and the machine soon wears omit' hisofficers say that at thirty-two he as completely U84 but there is plenty more of the raw material. With us, on the contrary, the raw material is not plentiful ; and when worked up into 'the trained soldier, it is the 'most expensive as well 118 the most valuable article of the description in the world.

The Crimea and Sebastopol come in for some critical remarks in the form of notes to maxims. The original conception seems to have been riskful, and altogether we were well through it.

"The expedition to the Crimea was undertaken in the belief that Sebastopol would fall before a coup de main. In any other view, the strength of the Allied armies which landed at Euputolia was very insufficient. The information of which our generals were in possession, as regarded the strength of the garrison of Sebastopol, the nature of its defences, and the number of Russian troops in the Crimea, was very imperfect. The march of the Allies from Eupatoraa to the Belbek was hazardous; their right flank rested on the sea, their left was exposed to an enemy of unknown strength. It is true the ships were an effectual protection ; but the condition of that protection was fine weather ; a storm would have deprived the army of their support."

Notwithstanding the frequent assertions that it was English slowness or want of skill, or want of something or other, that caused the long delay before Sebastopol, time is already working out the truth. Short as is the period that has elapsed, facts have peeped out bit by bit to expose the errors of our own correspondent." In Colonel Macdougall's opinion, the town would have been carried at the time fixed, but for the accident to the French magazines.

"It was decided to commence the approaches at nearly three times the usual distance, in the belief that our preponderance of fire was sufficient to reduce the place by what is called the artillery attack. The newspapers proclaimed exultingly that the defences of the town would fall down before our fire as did the walls of Jericho before the trumpets of Joshua : and there was more reason in this than has been generally supposed ; for when the Allies opened their fire on the 17th October, the English guns soon silenced the greater part of those opposed to them ; and had it not been for the unfortunate explosion of the French magazines' there is little doubt that a successful assault might have been delivered on the 19th or 20th; and though the assailants would have Hafted terribly from the fire of the ships in advancing to attack, yet after the defences were carried the heavy guns of the Allies could have taken up such a position as would soon have put an end to their power of further annoyance.

"Owing to the explosion of the French magazines the bombardment was a failure, and the siege dragged on its weary length through the terrible winter."

There are some strong remarks against overworking an army, and the text is further enforced by a commentary on Sebastopol.

"It was neither the cold nor the privation of that winter which was so fatal to the English army, but the overwork ; 20,000 Englishmen had the same amount of trench work and trench duty to perform as was allotted to the French force of 60,000. In addition to this, they occupied the most vulnerable point of the position, it is somewhat remarkable, that in the march from Enpatoria the exposed flank was the left, where the British were posted, and that after the march to the South side, the British were again to be found on the exposed flank, which was then the right. In both oases the French flank rested on the sea ; in the last ease they obtained the convenient harbour of Kamiesch, while the English had the miserable harbour

of Balaklava as their base. •

"These inconveniences are all to be traced to divided command. Without that, the work would have been equally divided; and the occupation of Balaklava, which weakened the Allied position, awl entailed greatly increased labour on the English force, would not have taken place."

The aim of the author is that "the theory of war" should be studied by the young officer before he joins, If he has not formed habits of study and acquired some knowledge of war (apart from mere regimental duty) beforehand, the probabilities are that ho will never gain them afterwards. The conclusion is rather a strange one; as if a lawyer should never get more law at an inn -oF court than he carries there, or a medical student learn nothing

at a hospital. We make no doubt, however, that the portrait is true.

"It will be conceded on all hands that the young soldier must receive a sound professional and practical training, either before or after he enters the ranks of the army. "Is it likely that he will receive such a training after joining his regiment ? It is to be feared not; though the very much to be commended system of large camps will oblige him to learn more of the mechanical part 'than heretofore. As a general rule, the officers of the British army are ignorant of the higher details of their profession. They have never been taught or encouraged to think on such subjects. "Physically the most active and fearless race in. the world, they find a went for their exuberant animal energy in field-sports, in the prosecution of which they voluntarily undergo an amount of fatigue that would knock up an Irish'navvy.' Confinement and study are irksome to them. The youngster, on joining, finds himself thrown into a set of extremely agreeable good fellows much older than himself, the force of whose example on all minds but those of a very strong stamp is almost irresistible ; and he enters with all his heart on a life which appears, at first sight, so particu

larly jolly.' * * "It is vain to expect that, as a general rule, young men entering the army at the age of seventeen or eighteen shall be honk fide educated up to the point required by many advocates of general education. A fondness for reading and thirst after knowledge are generally, by a blessed Providence, found to accompany a sickly constitution and weak body in the young ; but the nature of the healthy and vigorous is to dislike those pursuits which keep them shut up in school-rooms from the sunshine and activity it is their instinct to adore. Thus it is found that the bodily peculiarities which conduce most to mental culture are those 'which unfit their possessor for a life of activity and endurance, while the bodily qualities which are invaluable in a soldier are antagonistic to abstruse study."

Still, the combination of the two faculties, though rare, is to be met with ; and the true system would seem to be, to encourage it and bring it forward wherever it is found, by rendering each step or two in the service more difficult.