THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY.
THE .paralysis of the Dual Monarchy bids fair to continue. The events of the past week have shown that the. Hungarian crisis is as far as ever from a settlement. Not since 1867 has Hungary seen a more distracted year, for the famous Compact which Deltic engineered has for the first time been submitted to a hostile and searching criticism, and a fundamental differ- ence of opinion has appeared. on some of its most vital terms. Hungary, which more than any other Continental State has shown a true instinct for Constitutional govern- ment, has been governed for a year in defiance of all Constitu- tional rules. A Ministry without a majority has existed on sufferance. The Opposition, which commands the confidence of the bulk of the electorate, has refused to take office. Laws have been promulgated without Parliamentary sanction, and many administrative acts have been done which would naturally require a Bill of Indemnity to justify them, but which have been allowed to pass because the attention of the nation is distracted from ordinary Parliamentary business. The true battle is being fought outside the walls of Parliament between the Coalition, who claim to represent the nation, and the King, who is also the Emperor of its disliked and suspected neighbour. The bait of universal suffrage, which Baron .Fejervary thought would attract the masses to the side of the Crown, has proved of no avail ; and we have the singular result that while in Austria democratic reforms of far-reaching significance are in progress, in Hungary, hitherto a more progressive State, reforms have been rejected with contumely because a point of national honour is unsettled. It is a lesson in the power of nationalism to override all other political creeds.
The question at issue, like all great differences, can be reduced to a single point. Hungary demands that her Army shall be organised on a separate national basis, and that the Magyar language shall be used for the word of command. In effect, she claims the right to dictate her will to the King on military questions. The King, on the other hand; is prepared to make concessions as a matter of grace, such as the use of the Magyar tongue in military penal procedure; but he considers that the general use of that language would be subversive of military discipline and efficiency, and he claims the right to be the sole judge of what is desirable for the Army. The legal sovereign rights of the Monarch, he maintains, must be wholly inde- pendent of the discretion of transient Parliamentary majorities. The rights of Parliament are limited by law to the approval or rejection of Army credits and the annual vote for the enrolment of recruits. The organisa- tion and direction of the Army must remain wholly within the discretion of its head ; and if the King considers that certain concessions to national sentiment would weaken its efficiency, his decision must be final. Here is a radical cleavage of opinion, and, strangely enough, both sides appeal to the Compact of 1867. As the Times correspon- dent points out, that famous document was left inten- tionally vague on the subject. Certain Hungarian patriots, like the elder Tisza, wished the military prerogative of the Crown to be so defined as to permit of the development of a separate Hungarian Army and the use of the Hungarian language of command. On the other hand, peak and the elder Andrassy did not wish at the moment to risk a rupture with the King and imperil the success of their scheme. The Royal prerogative was, therefore, said to be " Consti- tutional," and in this ambiguity both sides took shelter. During the forty years which have elapsed since then the interpretation of the word has differed according to the inclinations of the commentators. The King, who has jealously respected the letter of the Compact, interpreted the phrase as meaning "recognised by Hungarian Consti- tutional law," .or " part of the Hungarian Constitution,"— the natural interpretation, it seems to us, when the assurances of Deiik and Andrassy are taken into account. Hungary, on the other hand, has come to regard it as meaning that the Royal prerogative was to be exercised under Constitutional—that is, Parliamentary—control. This reading, of course, makes nonsense of the word " preroga- tive." The result is that the expression has cloaked a radical difference of opinion between King and people,—a difference which existed in 1867, and which has not decreased since. That is the danger of " umbrella " definitions. Both parties may take their stand on the letter of a law, and find in it a justification for the widest divergence of views.
Is any compromise possible ? On the part of the King we think it unlikely. If he were not Francis Joseph, he might see the wisdom of recognising this national sentiment of which he is so suspicious, and, in reorganising the Hungarian Army in accordance with the national desire, increase its value, and add to the security of his throne. But his military prerogative is a subject on which he has shown no talent for compromise ; he has held one view for forty years, and he has every reason to believe that it is consistent with that Compact which is the charter of Hungarian rights. Of the strength of the feeling in Hungary, again, there can be no doubt. At the same time, we cannot believe that the policy of the Coalition is either wise or public-spirited. They propose apparently a truce,—the question is to be left in abeyance for a while, in order that Constitutional government may pro- ceed ; but they add to their proposal terms which the King cannot accept. In effect, as the Times correspondent points out, they ask him to agree to accept the verdict of a tribunal which they control. This is not to suspend the question ; it is to prejudge it. The only hopeful sign is to be found in the fact that all the members of the Coalition do not approve of the tactics of Count Albert Apponyi. Count Julius Andrassy, for example, seems to have tried to convince the King on Friday week that all that was wanted was a breathing-space, that the prepara- tion of a suffrage reform would take from three to five years, and that during that period feeling might change. If this is the attitude of many members of the Coalition, their proper course would be to propose a real truce without demanding from the King any pledges as to his ultimate conduct. If nothing can be done for three years, it is surely wise to suspend the agitation. It is far from certain that the better opinion in Hungary would not support this policy, for many must be tired of a barren anarchy. If the Coalition does not accept office, what is the alternative ? When Parliament meets on March 1st it will either be prorogued again—in which case Constitutionalism becomes still more of a farce—or it will be dissolved. The law demands a General Election within three mouths of a Dissolution. And if this course is followed, a Chamber will be returned without any of the elements of an alternative Ministry, and if the Coalition continue to refuse office, the deadlock will be extreme. If no arrangements, on the other hand, are made for a new Election, then we shall see the new treaties promulgated without a Parliament, and the taxes collected and new recruits enrolled arbitrarily, and, it is even possible, by force. The inflammable elements in the nation will be readily kindled by such a course. There are many moderate men in the Coalition, and if they desire to save their country from the miseries of an open breach with the Crown, they will do well to insist upon the acceptance of office and the temporary cessation of the main dispute. " His Majesty's Government must be carried on " is the kind of maxim which Hungarian statesmen would do well to remember.
At the back of Hungary's opposition lies, of course, the old jealousy of Vienna. She suspects her King of being at heart an Austrian Monarch, leaning in sympathy to the larger half of his Empire. Public opinion in Vienna is also irritated by what is felt to be the unreasonable intransigence of the Hungarian people. This racial friction can only be put an end to if both peoples recognise their real community of interests and the gravity of their international position. The misfortunes of Russia have freed them from one fear only to create another. Austria has become the hunting-ground of Pan- German propagandism, and if Hungary weakens the Dual Monarchy on the one side, her powerful neighbour on the other will inevitably profit by the event. It is the irony of the situation that in Hungary national feeling is strongest, and that Hungary would suffer most both in pride and pocket from any break-up of the Empire. If the vexatious question with the Crown can only be allowed to drop out of politics for the moment, and Hungarian statesmen reflect on their true position, they may fmd it wise to forego the amusement of burning their own house for the sake of making Austria uncomfortable.