THE POWERS AND THE WAR.
AS our readers know, we have again and again insisted that we should at once raise both our naval and our military forces to the highest poasibb pitch of efficiency. We have not done so, however, because we have any immediate or special dread of intervention by the Powers. The Continental Governments do not, we believe, want war with Great Britain on two grounds. To begin with, they are by no means certain how the conflict would end. They do not think, with the journalists, that because Britain cannot conquer the Boers out of hand, that therefore the British Navy is worthless, and that British military power has ceased to exist. They know that a war with the United Kingdom must mean a deadly struggle in which vast sums of money and thousands of men would be lost, even if it went well ; while if it went ill the Navies on which so many millions have been lavished would be absolutely thrown away. How would France feel if she dashed her Navy to pieces in trying to destroy Great Britain—on the French Navy the bulk of the work must fall, even supposing a coalition —and was left facing Germany, not, as now, with the splendid advantage of a vast naval preponderance, but upon equal terms? France may not love En gland ,but, as Charles II. said to his brother, she does not want to kill England in order to make Germany King in Europe. But quite apart from those doubts and fears, the Powers are for the moment anxious for other things than war. Some three or four years ago, the Powers seemed to have reached the acme of military preparation, and to be inclined to take the view that it was useless settling to anything till the inevit- able struggle bad been got over. Since then, however, they have each and all turned their activities in directions more or less pacific,—or, at any rate, upon schemes which would be much disturbed by a great war. Russia, to begin with, has still got her Far Eastern projects on her hands. She is getting a firmer bold every day on Manchuria no doubt—and small blame to her, in our view—but still the situation is, and must be, precarious till the Siberian Railway is finished, and till Japan has been in some way or other reconciled to the notion that she will not be allowed to " run " China. Again, Russia's Persian policy—a policy partly commercial and partly political—even if meant to be hostile to Great Britain, is one she would far rather carry out by indirect and independent means than by an act of intervention. Intervention by coalition must mean war— the Powers know that we would rather risk going out utterly from the family of nations than be treated as Japan was treated—but if such a war took place there must be a general agreement about China and Persia. Germany is, we believe, friendly, because we were wise enough a year or more before the war began to make it clear to Germany that we aimed at no policy of monopoly in the Southern half of the African Continent, and that we should not there play the game of the dog-in-the-manger. But even apart from that, Germany is at present too much occupied to be anxious for the risks of war. Her material prosperity is enormous, but she is not satisfied with it at present, and wants to build upon it a still greater commercial expan- sion. In Asia Minor, in the Valley of the Euphrates, and in China, Germany is developing plans on the very greatest and most thorough scale. Lastly, Germany is anxious to prepare a Fleet which shall be able to make her Colonies in posse and in ease effective possessions, for she knows that without a Fleet a Colonial Empire is like a necklace of beads without a thread,—no use, but rather a source of worry and anxiety to the possessor. Even more certain is it that the French Government does not want war. It is at this moment expecting an immense influx of prosperity from the Exhibition, which will not only greatly benefit French commerce indirectly by letting Europe and America see her excellence in the arts and manufactures—the motor-car section will, we believe, be a revelation to the whole world—but will also pour a flood of gold into Paris, and so tend, to keep quiet that uneasy and excitable population. The present French Govern- ment is one of the best that France has had for many years, but it has a very difficult task before it,— a task of reconstruction. It wants to build up the Republic on a sounder basis, and without breaking hope- lessly with the Church or depressing the Army unduly, to keep both those institutions under firm lay and civilian control. But this task, one essential to the permanent welfare of France, is not a task to be carried out during war. In regard to Austria and Italy the same desire for peace is apparent, and they have, besides, no desire to see a Power which has always been friendly to them put in jeopardy. But, it may be urged, if we think this, why should we make such strenuous efforts to see our Navy increased, and a, new Army for home and foreign defence raised without delay. Our reason is a perfectly sound one. We realise that the Governments do not in the least want war, but we realise also that each one of them is liable to be carried off its feet by a wave of popular emotion. We also realise that a wave of popular emotion demanding " the destruction of the pirate's nest" is far more likely to come if while all England's weaknesses are grossly exaggerated abroad there is no visible answer in a Navy in home waters ready and vigilant for defence, though not for offence, and in a country bristling with bayonets. If England is placed in such a posture of defence there is little risk of the cry of Carthago eat delenda running round Europe, or if it were to begin the Govern- ments could silence it by pointing to our state of defence. We want each one of them, when under pressure, to be able to say, "Just think out calmly what you are asking us to do," not to be obliged to say, "Well, we must admit that it does not look as if an attack on England would just now be a very formidable task." In no way can we better support the desire of foreign Governments to keep the peace than by bona-iide defensive armaments.
When we say that granted we take proper precautions there will be no attempt at foreign intervention we do not, of course, mean to say that none of the Powers will attempt to make capital out of the situation. Most assuredly they will here and there, and, indeed, wherever they can, try to use this lucky opportunity to get hold of places to which we have hitherto barred the way, and to do things which we have hitherto forbidden them to do. No doubt many people will look with great horror on this prospect. For ourselves we must confess that we view it with the utmost equanimity. Indeed, we will go further, and say that we should regard it as a piece of national good fortune if the Foreign Office were now to be forced by circumstances to give up the ill-founded and antiquated objections, which it has or is supposed to have, to many things desired by foreign Powers. We say " supposed to have" advisedly, because to a great extent the Foreign Office has been made a scapegoat. When a Foreign Minister has, wanted to prevent some foolish but very popular step being taken in Colonial affairs it has been found very useful to use the form,—" We should like to do this very much, but that terrible British Foreign Office bars the way." Thus the Foreign Office has become a sort of common bugbear. A wiser administration would have rejected the performing of this function, but the Foreign Office seems always rather pleased to act as the stuffed dog-in-the-manger.—" They don't really want it, so what harm is there in our keeping them out till they ask us plainly and seriously to go." That does not seem to us a very wise diplomacy. But however that may be, we shall be pleased to see these charges about the dog-in-the-manger put an end to by the Powers taking things which we do not want for ourselves, but which we have been wont to pretend we would not let them have. We shall not, then, grieve over Russia making Conventions in regard to Persia, North or South, or advancing in China outside our sphere of influence ; over Germany taking bolder steps in Asia Minor or Syria ; over France acquiring influence or territory in Morocco, or even over Russia get- ting into the Mediterranean by seizing a port from Morocco or buying one from Spain. Indeed, in the last proposal we see many advantages. We cannot have the Mediterranean to ourselves and therefore the more Powers there the better. How far Germany would like to see Morocco in the bands of France ; or what would be the opinion of Austria in regard to the possession of a Mediterranean port by Russia we cannot of course say. Still, that is their business, not ours. Our contention is solely that it would not injure us, and that it is for those who would be injured, not for us to object. Let those who think this statement in regard to Russia and the Mediterranean a hard saying remember that what really gives naval strength is ships and not ports, and that what will make Russia formidable to us is not the taking of ports in Persia and Morocco or China or elsewhere, which possibly we might prevent, but the building of ironclads, which we certainly cannot prevent. Depend upon it Russia will be far more friendly to us, and far more easy to deal with when she has ports, on the Persian Gulf and on the Mediterranean, and hence we should do nothing to pre- vent, but rather should encourage, any movements in that direction. Of course, if any of the Powers asked any- thing really dangerous to our interests we would run all risks to withstand their demands, but if we merely see Powers taking things they had much better have been allowed to take long ago we shall feel neither depressed nor ashamed.
On the whole, then, we feel no special anxiety about the action of the Powers so long as our preparations, naval and military, are on a reallyadequate scale, and so long as we make it clear that we shall not yield to intervention, even if that intervention is agreed to by every Continental State. If we do that, and if the Foreign Office is not so foolish as to try to choose the present moment for putting into operation the dog-in-the-manger policy in excelsis, we shall not meet with any great international difficulties. An absolutely determined front on the main issue—i.e., the war—coupled with really adequate naval and military preparations and a reasonable and broad-minded diplo- macy; those are the things now needful. We shall, indeed, have good ground for blessing the war if it ends in the final abandonment of the dog-in-the-manger policy, and makes us act on the only fair and reasonable principle of either taking it for ourselves or leaving it to others.
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