O N Wednesday the French Senate by 215 votes to 37
adopted the Anglo-French Agreement in its entirety. But though M. Delcass6's warm defence of the Agree- ment evidently impressed his hearers, and though the Senate, like the Chamber, was determined to support the Government, it is, we think, clear that both Chambers, like the people of France, feel sympathy for the Agree- ment chiefly because it maintains a firm understanding with England, and so immensely raises the power and security of France in Europe. The fact that it establishes on a foundation of granite the great African and Indo- Chinese Empires of France, and turns what were once Imperial aspirations into Imperial realities, seems hardly to touch the majority of Frenchmen. As always, France can be induced with difficulty to believe that anything outside Europe really matters. Yet if we consider for a moment what France gains from the Imperial stand- point by the Agreement we shall be astonished that her people are not more deeply impressed. In dwelling on the new Empire of France, we will leave out of account altogether the acknowledgment by France's only competitor in Indo-China, that her great possessions in that region are in future to be hers without let or hindrance. The consolidation of the African Empire of France under the Anglo-French Agreement is alone quite sufficient cause for French congratulation. Here the Agreement makes definite and tangible the wildest dreams of French Imperialists of ten years ago. We are not jealous or envious of France, but we cannot fail to note that the free hand. in Morocco conceded to her by us gives her the most valuable section of the world's surface obtained by a white Power for the last hundred years. It is true that the control of Morocco accorded to France by the only Power in a position to dispute her right to it is con- cealed by diplomatic forms. None the less, the fact remains that what France obtains under the Agreement is the right to deal with Morocco as she has dealt with Tunis and Algeria. • All that the talk about "peaceful penetration" and the maintenance of the authority of the Sultan really means is that France will not be in a, hurry, and that she wisely prefers to exert her authority and influence over Morocco, in the first place, through a native Sovereign. By doing so in Tunis she has avoided many of the dangers and difficulties incident to the conquest of Algeria, and she has, therefore, determined to follow the Tunisian rather than the Algerian precedent. The language of statesmanship and diplomacy must not, however, blind us to the fact that Morocco as soon as the French are ready will become as much a part of the oversee Empire of France as Egypt is of that of England. Morocco is without question a most desirable possession. It does not take weeks of travel to reach it, like India or South Africa. It lies at the very gate of Europe. From Plymouth its ports are only four days' sail, while from the south-western coast of France it can be reached in forty-eight hours, and from Marseilles in even less time. These facts have made it a land long and ardently desired by all the great colonising Powers. To France, however, it is specially attractive, since it borders the rich and firmly established French colony of Algeria. If any other Power had obtained control of Morocco, France's ideal of a great North African Empire could never have been accomplished. As it is, that ideal is secured, and France as soon as she likes will hold undisputed sway from the Gulf of Cabes to Cape Juby, and so over the portion of Africa which, as the Romans proved, resembles Southern Europe in all essentials.
Morocco, with its Atlantic and Mediterranean seaboards, is from many points of view the portion best worth having of all the magnificent stretch of territory which made up Roman North Africa. Not only is its climate good and its soil fruitful, but it is known to be full of mineral deposits of the highest value. It is true that the inhabitants are fierce and fanatical ; but if the French display tact and good sense in handling them, they will soon respond to the advantages of a settled government. The Moors, like other people, appreciate prosperity and security. It is, however, not only the right to possess and develop Morocco whenever she is desirous so to do that France obtains under the Anglo-French Agreement. The cession of the islands just off one of her most flourishing dependencies, the rights of entry accorded to her on the Gambia, and the arrange- ments by which her possessions in Africa will henceforth have their Hinterlands linked up with each other, will render her in the future the one Power in Africa with a consolidated Empire. While the British, German, and Portuguese possessions in Africa are dotted hap- hazard about the map, France has her mainland pos- sessions brought into direct relation with each other,— a matter not only of immense strategic, but also of immense commercial, importance. Except for the great and rich island of Madagascar, the French possessions in Africa will henceforth be either conter- minous, or else capable of being made conterminous. That, surely, is a great achievement, and. one which we can- not help feeling surprised should attract, comparatively speaking, so small an amount of enthusiasm in France. France as a whole does not, as we have said, seem at all to realise the mightiness of the Empire of which she has made herself the possessor.
When we write as we have done above, it must not be supposed that we are so foolish as to imagine that this consolidation of the French Empire is solely due to British friendliness and benevolence. We realise to the full that the magnificent Empire of France in Africa has been won by French courage, French persistence, and French statesmanship. France owes her possessions to her own sons, and to no one else. All we desire to point out is that the practical value of the great African Empire won by France has been immensely increased by the under- standing arrived at between France and Britain. We also most readily acknowledge that the Agreement has proved a double blessing, and that we too have obtained great advantages under it. If the advantages are not quite so striking and. sensational in our case as in that of France, this is not due to any want of generosity or fair dealing on the part of France, but rather to the hard facts of the situa- tion. It happened not to be physically possible for France to concede so much to us as we were able to concede to her; but this was not the fault of France. The Agreement was wisely drawn up on the principle that each Power should concede as much as possible, and that neither should say to the other : " This or that concession would not hurt me, but I shall not make it because you cannot give me an equivalent." Both Powers rightly rejected the lore "of nicely calculated less or more," and considered
•
the whole matter just as would two private friends who were making an agreement. Mutual satisfaction was, they held, the object to be striven for, and not an exactly balanced bargain. It was enough for us to obtain the sanction of France to our presence in Egypt, and the settlement of the Newfoundland shore dispute. Whether or not these advantages were less great than the advan- tages and the actual cession of territory obtained by France was a matter which our Government rightly refused to consider.
As we read M. Delcasses speech there is only one point that causes us regret. We wish that it had proved possible to make an absolutely "clean job" both in the case of the Gambia and of the Newfoundland fisheries. We should have liked to have seen France conceding the islands of Miquelon and St. Pierre to us, and foregoing any rights to fishing in Newfoundland waters other than those enjoyed by the Americans, and we at the same time conceding the whole of our Gambia Colony out and out to France. We are fully aware that such an arrangement would have been unpopular here, and that critics of the Government would have been able to show, and doubtless on good grounds, that the Gambia was infinitely more valuable than the North American islands. Notwithstanding this, we should have liked to see the exchange made on the general ground that, though we might have lost on the special bargain, we should have gained by doing away altogether with a possible source of friction. We suppose it is too much to hope that such an exchange could now be effected—that the French would agree to a bargain so favourable to them we cannot doubt —but if it could be, we should regard the result with great satisfaction. No doubt the Gambia is a very valuable possession, while the islands are hardly that ; but in the case of France we should, as we have said, regard the absolute eliminating of all possibility of fishing troubles as sufficient compensation for any actual and temporary loss. In any case, the Agreement is a great achievement, and we most heartily congratulate France upon being able to enter, without any fear of interference or of creating jealousy, on the task of consolidating and developing her magnificent North African Empire. To have vast colonies secured to her at her very doors is indeed the luxury of Empire.
THE CHANCES OF SETTLEMENT IN THE SCOTCH CHURCHES.
Previous page
