W HETHER Port Arthur will fall or not before the Baltic
Fleet reaches the China seas is a matter still in doubt, though at the present moment the signs point to a speedy end to the siege. But in any case the war is entering upon a new phase, and one which cannot but be fraught with the greatest anxiety for this country. And for this reason. The new phase is distinctly less favourable to the Japanese. It has been freely said that if the Baltic Fleet shq,uld hear of the fall of Port Arthur before it reaches Far Eastern waters, it will return whence it came. That is a view which we do not share. It seems to us far more likely that the Russian Fleet, whatever happens, will now attempt to make its way to Vladivostok. Vladivostok will not be affected by the fall of Port Arthur, and that arsenal, and not the Liao-tung Peninsula, has always been the objective of the Baltic Fleet. No doubt it is possible —nay, probable—that Admiral Togo will be able to beat the Russian Fleet at sea ; but if he should not do so, and if Japan were to lose the command of the sea during next spring or summer, or even were to retain only a doubtful, partial, and harassed command, the position of Japan would be precarious. With half-a-million men in the field on the mainland drawing all their supplies from across the water, the- free use of the sea is a matter of vital import. Japan, to be safe, ought to feel as we were able to feel during the Boer War,—that every sea-path between her and her army is secure. While the Baltic Fleet is in being Japan can feel no such security. This would be so even if the Baltic Fleet were still as inefficient as it was represented to be when its ships left European waters. There is, however, every reason to believe that the fleet is daily improving as a fighting force, and that its long voyage will have proved a school of seaman- ship. As to the strength of the battleships and cruisers of which it is composed there can be no doubt. They are among the most powerful vessels of war afloat to- day. Till, then, the Japanese have managed to bring the Russians to battle, and have beaten them and sunk their ships—by no means so easy a task as the writers of "Battle of Dorking" naval fiction assume—the naval situation must be one of great uncertainty.
On land, though the Japanese have been uniformly successful, the causes for anxiety on their part are hardly less grave. They have been successful, it is true, but they have not been successful enough. They have beaten the Rus- sians in every important action, but every action has been a Pyrrhie victory. They have never surrounded and destroyed or taken prisoners a Russian force of any size, and their captures of guns and material have been insignificant. If they have always overcome the Russians in the field, the Russians have always been able to fall back with their forces practically intact. But by this often-repeated process the Russians have been converting themselves into a new army. What was raw metal nine months ago has been hammered out by the Japanese on the anvil of war, and has become tempered steel. Nothing, indeed, has been more remarkable than this gradual improvement during the war in the fighting efficiency of the Russians. It is no exaggera- tion to say that their army is ten times more efficient than it was last spring. The Japanese, on the other hand, though they began so well, have not improved. That improvement was not possible as regards the fighting qualities of both offfters and soldiers we readily admit. They began as a band of heroes, and so they have continued. But while their courage and their patriotism have been a lesson to the whole world, it has also become clear that in certain of the qualities which go to the winning of great victories they are deficient. They have thrown up no leaders with the -true genius for war. The great general is like a great violin-player. Much of his success in his art is due to training and practice, but there is something beyond this,— an instinct or an inspiration which enables the player to pass far beyond the limits of what he has learned by study. So with the general. If he is to do great things in war, he musthavethat" afflatus " which, as one of his contemporaries noted, belonged to Cromwell. Of such afflatus the Japanese generali have hitherto shown no sign. In all that pertains • to the mechanical side of war they are perfect. The machinery moves with absolute certainty and regularity; but the processes are those of ratiocination, and not of inspiration. Everything that can be done by logic and logical anticipation is done ; but there is no surprise, no skipping o a thousand subservient details to achieve, as by fire, a great purpose. These defects are brought out with great force and ability in the remarkable articles which Mr. F. A. McKenzie is contributing to the Daily Mail. Though it may at first sight seem paradoxical, we cannot help wondering whether this failure on the part of the Japanese may not come from the fact that they are too civilised and too highly educated a nation. Centuries of a very complete civilisation have deprived the ruling part of their population of all interest in the crafts that are the natural school of war. War has something in it akin to the arts of the explorer and the hunter, but these have naturally vanished from a land which was fully explored and fully peopled many centuries ago, and has since been cut off from the rest of the world. The Japanese have failed to produce generals of genius, whereas the Americans, though not a martial people, were conspicuous for their production during the Civil War. The reason, we believe, is that the America of the " forties " and " fifties " was a backwoods country, while Japan for over a thousand years has not been a backwoods land, but rather a land of ordered civilisation.
Putting, however, such speculations aside, the fact remains that the new phase on which the war is entering may very possibly prove unfavourable to Japan. Her command of the sea, so vital to her interests, is threatened, and she is not making that overwhelming progress which the best informed critics expected considering how infinitely better her Army is than the Army of her antagonist. We have said that these facts must be a cause of anxiety to the British people. A very little reflection will show how and why this is the case. It is no doubt true that even if the Japanese got into serious difficulties, we are not bound by our Treaty to come to their assistance unless—which would certainly not be the case if they were losing—some third Power inter- vened on the side of Russia. But though this may be true in the abstract, we must remember that Japan has many warm friends in this country, and that if she once gets into serious peril there is certain to be a strong demand that we should not desert our ally. This demand is also likely to be enforced by the suggestion that we have in any case made ourselves the enemies of Russia, and that we had bettor fight it out with her while Japan can still render us effective aid, rather than allow Japan to be overwhelmed, and then await single-handedthe inevitable attack-of Russia. For ourselves, we need hardly say that we should have no sympathy with such a plea, but that does not alter our belief that it is likely to be made, and that there is considerable danger of it finding favour with a section of the British public. A strong Government might be able to hold out against a vehement outcry that we should "save our ally," but can we trust the present Government to keep their heads if faced with what might seem for the moment a universal demand for intervention in favour of Japan ? But if our Government were to yield, and were to take any step antagonistic to Russia, we should almost inevitably find ourselves face to face with a crisis as serious as any in our history. France, with the best intentions in the world as regards peace, could. not desert Russia if we were to intervene to help Japan. But if France and Russia were arrayed against us, we should almost certainly find them joined by Germany. Are we prepared for such a war?
When, nearly three years ago, the Government entered upon the Japanese Alliance, we pointed out the dangers that were likely to ensue from it. We added a strong expression of hope that the Government, having embarked on a policy so intrinsically perilous as the Japanese Alliance, would, while there was yet time, begin to make every possible preparation for the war that might arise out of their policy. We urged that they should frankly face the consequences of their acts, and since they were calling into existence new war risks, should insure against them adequately by increasing and improving our military forces, and by making them sufficient and appropriate for the special form of war likely to arise 'out of the policy of alliance with Japan. Surely that was no very unreasonable advice, but rather advice dictated by common-sense. Has it been followed ? Have the Government in the three years of grace between the formation of the Alliance and the present time done every- thing in their power to give us the kind of army that will be required if the Japanese Alliance involves us in war next spring. All that we have heard of such preparations is that Mr. Arnold-Forster has been allowed to make plans for, and even to begin the work of, destroying the machinery— imperfect machinery, no doubt, but still machinery in being—by which we managed to raise a large force for the South African War. But perhaps it may be said that the Government have, at any rate, accumulated large stores of material against such a contingency as we have described. We wish we could think so. Unfortunately, all that we know is in the opposite sense. Thanks to the patriotism and vigilance of the St. ,Tames's Gazette, we know that instead of using the three precious years since the promul- gation of the Alliance to provide us at any rate with a perfect system of field and horse artillery, the Government have done nothing. If at this moment we had to go to war with Russia, let alone France and Germany, we should have to face our enemies with the worst artillery in the world. Surely such neglect, matched with a policy so inherently perilous as that of the Japanese Alliance, is nothing short of criminal. It may be urged that the Government cannot get men in millions because we have no compulsory service, but at least they could have given us efficient guns. This they have failed to do, though they have had nearly three years in which to accomplish the work. In our opinion, the Ministry deserve the gravest censure for placing us in a position so dangerous, even though no actual harm should be done and war be avoided. If war is not avoided, and if we have to face the world in arms unprovided in the matter of artillery what, we wonder, will be the verdict of the nation ?
THE OVERSEA EMPIRE OF FRANCE.
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