LEADING FROM STRENGTH
DUR1NG the intense diplomatic activity of the last few days the shape of the Suez conference has perceptibly altered from that which it assumed when it was first announced. Then it appeared to be conceived as an implicit condemnation of Colonel Nasser's action in nationalising the Canal. But the Foreign Office statement that acceptance of invitations to it did not necessarily mean acceptance of the principle of internationalisation made it easier for Asian countries to attend and it is now clear that disapproval of Colonel Nasser is by no means so widespread or so far-reaching as the British and French Governments had originally hoped. Even countries like Norway and Holland are expressing doubts over the wisdom of any possible Western intervention in the Canal area—not to mention those which were to be expected on the part of the Colombo powers. The conference will cer- tainly not be weighted in favour of the Franco-British line. DUR1NG the intense diplomatic activity of the last few days the shape of the Suez conference has perceptibly altered from that which it assumed when it was first announced. Then it appeared to be conceived as an implicit condemnation of Colonel Nasser's action in nationalising the Canal. But the Foreign Office statement that acceptance of invitations to it did not necessarily mean acceptance of the principle of internationalisation made it easier for Asian countries to attend and it is now clear that disapproval of Colonel Nasser is by no means so widespread or so far-reaching as the British and French Governments had originally hoped. Even countries like Norway and Holland are expressing doubts over the wisdom of any possible Western intervention in the Canal area—not to mention those which were to be expected on the part of the Colombo powers. The conference will cer- tainly not be weighted in favour of the Franco-British line.
There are two ways of looking at the situation which has arisen through Egypt's action. One is to regard the nationalisa- tion of the Canal as legitimate enough, but to believe that the control of so important a waterway cannot be left to any one country. The second is to believe, as Sir Anthony Eden sug- gested in his broadcast on Wednesday, that no faith can be placed in the promises of the present Egyptian Government any more than in those of Hitler at the time of the march into the Rhineland. In view of the potential instability of the Egyp- tian internal situation and the virulent provocations poured out by the Cairo press and radio there is a good deal to be said for the British and French feeling that the second view is the cor- rect one. However, it must be recognised in Paris and London that the majority of world opinion is against us in this matter. It seems likely that most of the States represented at the con- ference will be interested exclusively in the Suez question rather than in the dangers to world peace of Colonel Nasser's ambitions. Anglo-French diplomacy will, therefore, be faced with the task not merely of being more responsible than Egypt, but of appearing so. At the conference they will have to see that agreement is reached on internationalisation of the Canal, on its maintenance and on the fixing of dues with proper regard to consumer interests, and that this agreement is then presented in such a form that any infraction of it will appear a breach of international law to the most hardened anti-colonialist.
Britain and France, indeed, have lost a number of points in the game of diplomatic poker which has been proceeding over the last week. By uttering loud and threatening noises before the conference meets they have made it easy for a specious propaganda to represent them as aggressors, and this is a serious matter—whatever good it may have done Sir Anthony Eden with the Conservative Party or M. Mollet with /he National Assembly. Their case is so strong that there should have been no need to bluster; but the issues of nationalisation and international control have been allowed to become hope- lessly muddled, and the Western case has almost gone by default. Finally, our diplomacy has neglected to make sufficient use of its one real point against Egypt: the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping through the Canal over the last eight years. Here is a genuine instance of denial of freedom of navigation on the Canal. Here is an earnest of Colonel Nasser's intentions in the future which can hardly be neglected. Moreover, the failure of the UN to deal with *this breach of international law is a perfectly good reason for not taking the Suez question to the Security Council. Yet little use has been made here of this weapon. By their insistence on keeping the Palestine issue separate (as though reality could be treated like a section of an official minute) Western statesmen have deprived themselves of the best retort to Egyptian protestations. The Prime Minister has referred in the House of Commons to the question of Israeli shipping as being 'slightly, to put it mildly, in a different category,' but there is a very simple reply to this. It is the question 'Why?' which Mr. Silverman posed, but to which he received no satisfactory answer. Fortunately, there are signs of more realism in Paris than in London, to judge from recent statements of the official spokesman at the Quai d'Orsay.
It is a matter of some urgency for this country to prevent ourselves and France from becoming isolated over the Suez issue. At present we enjoy the support of some members of the Commonwealth and a rather hazy moral backing from the US. If the conference were to break down, what further steps may be required will be made immeasurably more difficult—short of some rash action on the Egyptian side—if our present isolation were to continue. To end it should be one aim of British diplomacy at the conference. It must be hoped that Egypt will agree, as Sir Anthony insisted, to a workable scheme. Colonel Nasser and his Government will have to be judged on their future behaviour. We cannot afford further breaches of inter- national good faith on the part of Egypt, and the sternest measures should be taken to repress them if they occur. An agreement reached in London will be no reason for failing to strengthen our position in the Middle East against all eventuali- ties, and to this end the surest way is still to supply Israel with arms and bind her to us by an alliance.
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