M. FLOURENS ON ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA.
MFLOURENS, the late Foreign Minister of France, • has written an interesting paper in the New Review, which is intended to show that the relations of France and Russia were, till within a few years ago, in no way a threat to the peace of Europe, but rather a security for the maintenance of that balance of power which can alone secure the peace of Europe. And he shows that this was the view of our own Foreign Office for some years after 1870, and even in 1875; but, unluckily, his dates are throughout printed wrong by four years, and assign to the year 1879 what was only true of 1875, and would not have been at all apposite to the later date. Still less has it any relation to 1889, when both the power of France and her attitude towards England and English affairs have been entirely transformed, and transformed very much for the worse. Even in 1879, the year chiefly spoken of in M. Flourens' article, Lord Derby was no longer in office, and the Due Decazes had been two years out of office in France ; so that the story reads very oddly as it has been printed in the New Review. But in 1875 there was imminent danger of the breaking out of war on a great scale, and Lord Derby, as Tory Foreign Secretary, firmly supported the right of France to determine the magnitude of her own Army as against the threats which were hurled at her from Berlin. There is no doubt that during the early part of Lord Derby's administration of that office, he was much more afraid of Germany falling upon France a second time, while she was yet unprepared for such a contest, than he was of Russia gaining an influence' in the East which would embarrass us both in India and in Turkey. At that time it will be remembered that we had not yet been compelled to intervene in Egypt. None of those more serious difficulties with France had arisen which have made the latter years of our diplomacy full of anxiety for the consequences of a rupture with her. This is an aspect of the ease which M. Flourens leaves entirely out of sight, for he writes just as if precisely the same conditions would govern our attitude towards France now, as governed it at the time Germany took so high a hand towards France in 1875. In truth, however, the situation is wholly different. There is no doubt that in 1875 France was by no means prepared to cope with Germany, and was as anxious for peace as we could be, supposing peace could be secured without a sacri- fice of her independence and honour. And there was then little danger that even if France could be so far fortified as to hold on her way without paying any attention to the threats of the German Press, that way would for the time be otherwise than peaceful. She needed years to secure her Eastern frontier adequately, and she was as anxious for the friendship of Great Britain as she now appears to be indifferent to it. Russia, on the other hand, was, as M. Flourens justlLdaid, at that time in close friendship with Germany, and France been crushed, we should have had more to fear from Russia in Asia, where it would have been for the interest of Germany to encourage her to extend her dominions, than we ever could have had while Russia felt herself bound over to good behaviour by fear of Germany and German Poland. Unfortunately, in the last fourteen years the situation has been very much altered. The attempt to break up France is still no doubt as much opposed to all statesman- like principles as it was in 1875. Nothing but mischief could come of such a revolution in the condition of Europe as that would involve. But, in the first place, there is nothing like the same fear of it. France is vastly stronger in 1889 than she was in 1875, and the German invasion of France would be an undertaking from which even the German Generals would probably shrink, unless the need were very great indeed. And next, besides being very much stronger, France has, unfortunately, become at the same time very much more captious, and disposed to play the part of the dog in the manger towards the duties which England, much against her will, has assumed in Egypt. France would not join us in restoring order in Egypt, and yet she will not let us do our best to restore the finances and regulate the government of the Khedive. The consequence is, that while we have no reason to fear the sea of European troubles which would arise from the crushing of France, we have a good deal of reason to fear that France and Russia actino•° in combination might un- settle much which is now settled, render our position in Egypt perilous, if not impossible, and be the cause of a struggle in the South-East of Europe which might extend to a general war.
The great difference between the situation of 1875 and 1889 is this,—that in 1875 it was certain that France could not be aggressive, while it was greatly to be feared that Germany might be aggressive. Now the fear is rather the other way, not that France is strong enough to threaten Ger- many without the most powerful support from some great ally, but that she is strong enough to meddle in various ways, besides that, unfortunately for us, the Foreign Minister who has succeeded M. Flourens has been inclined to divert attention from the ill-success of the French Colonial policy, and from the annoyance which the growing power of Italy causes the French people, by making the power of France felt unpleasantly whenever he feels that he can do so with- out provoking attack. This being the case, there is evidently no occasion at all for England to encourage France- to assert her independence, as there was in 1876, when Germany and Russia were co-operating with the utmost cordiality, and when there was far more danger of war from the wish felt in Germany to seize the opportunity of France's weakness and of Russia's friendliness, than from any alliance between France and Russia. It is true, as M. Flourens points out, that even then Alexander IL was well aware that it would never do for him to allow France to be overborne by the arrogance of Germany, and that he used the influence of a great and friendly Power to repress the ambition of Germany, just as Lord Derby did. But still, that was a time at which no active combination for aggressive purposes between France and Russia was at all to be feared, and that is not the case now. Indeed, this seems to us plain, that if France and Russia are both as pacific as M. Flourens appears to think, there is no danger to the peace of Europe at all. It is certain that Germany will not invade either of those countries without great provocation • and even if troubles spring up in the Balkans, they could only grow to formidable dimensions through Russia's intervention, while Russia would hardly intervene without the support of France. We cannot think, then, that M. Flourens' attempt to show that the reasons which justified England in 1875 in firmly supporting Alexander II. in his intervention to save France from being overpowered, apply at all to the present crisis. Egypt is our immediate difficulty, and till France adopts a very different policy in relation to Egypt from that which she has adopted recently, it can be no interest of England's to throw her influence into the scale on the side of France. The conditions of equilibrium in Europe have changed very greatly indeed within the last fourteen years.
Previous page
