WAR AND OUR FOOD-SUPPLIES.
MR. BALFOUR'S deliverances on economic subjects when he is dealing with abstract propositions are not always wholly satisfactory to the Free-trader. He some- times appears to see more in the ideas of the Protectionists than a level-headed, clear-sighted man such as he un- doubtedly is ought to see in them. When, however, it comes to concrete propositions and definite and practical proposals there is no living statesman who more success- fully destroys, smashes, and pulverises the delusion that lies at the bottom of all Protection,—the delusion that you can somehow increase the wealth and prosperity of a country by forcing its inhabitants to buy in the dear market rather than in the cheap, and that, in fact, waste when called by a good mouth-filling name becomes a form of saving. Mr. Balfour was in the best possible form when he dealt with Mr. Seton-Karr's strange proposal to secure a due supply of food in time of war. With inimitable skill he turned the various suggestions inside out, and flashed the light of common-sense and sound reason upon the sophistries with which the mind of the House of Commons had been darkened. He treated the House and its fears as might a sensible householder suddenly assailed by the ladies of his family with some awful proposi- tion about the provisioning of the establishment. One hears the appeal of the timid wife : I can't help feeling, dear, that in the isolated position in which we live we are in daily danger of starving. The butcher, the baker, and the greengrocer are all very ill- tempered men and very quarrelsome, and cook says they hate us dreadfully. Suppose they were to agree not to call for a week, shouldn't we starve ? We never have more than two days' supply in the house, and the other tradesmen haven't enough for us or would be afraid of sending. It's a dreadful idea. Oughtn't we, don't you think, to build some very big cupboards and keep a supply by us ; or how would it be to plough up the tennis-lawn and grow useful things there ? We shouldn't then be so dreadfully dependent on strangers.' Well, Mr. Balfour gave to these timid flutterings and confused apprehensions just the comfortable answer to be expected from the sensible householder_ ' Don't be afraid. There is very little danger of their refusing to call, because they are all very eager for our custom. The baker's business, in fact, chiefly depends upon our household, and he wouldn't in the least know what to do with all his stuff if he refused to sell it to us. It is pretty much the same with the others. Even if one of them quarrelled ever so much with us he would be sure to try to send his goods up by the carts of the others, or else by the carrier, or even by our own carts. It would only be a waste either to build cup- boards or to plough up the lawn. The only thing we need be particular about is keeping a good lot of carts and horses and men always ready. Then, if there is any trouble or difficulty, we can always keep the road open and can send down to other tradesmen to supply us. As long as we have got a good. road to the house, plenty of carts, and are able to pay a good price, we shall no more want for food than the people who grow it all on theinown farms.'
To see that this was the debate in a nutshell we have only to look at Mr. Seton-Karr's speech and Mr. Balfour's answer. Mr. Seton-Karr had three remedies to propose. The first was commercial federation with our Colonies, the next the increase of our wheat production at home, the last State granaries. Unless some or all of these remedies were adopted, Mr. Seton-Karr drew an awful picture of what would happen if we went to war with any of the great corn-producing countries, or if those countries were from some hostile motive to boycott us—i.e., not to st.11 us their corn—or again, if any Power were to be able to blockade our coasts and make corn and other bread- stuffs contraband of war. Let us take one by one these bogies, which according to Mr. Seton-Karr can only be laid by Protection, either in its simple form of a nice little duty on wheat, or else under some of its aliases such as an Imperial tariff or a bounty on corn-growing, or else by the heroic remedy of turning the State into a mammoth corn-factor. First let us suppose ourselves at war with Russia and America at once,—a very unlikely, indeed an almost impossible, event. In that case, no doubt, Russia and America, would not sell us their corn directly. They would not, that is, allow our ships to put into their harbours and load corn. But would they try to extend this boycott to the rest of the world ? Would they refuse to let Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, Italian, French, and German vessels load corn in their ports ? Assuredly not. But if they did, how could they prevent these ships directly they were loaded clearing for English ports ? It would be useless to say that the vessels must not sail unless they were bound for Continental ports, for the only effect would be that the ships would change their destina- tion when they were on the high seas. The idea of a corn boycott is equally absurd. There are two or three million farmers in the 'Western States whose sole occupa- tion is in effect to grow corn for the English market. Is it likely that these men—the men who complain so bitterly of low prices for their corn—would consent to get no price at all,—would allow, that is, their Government to say: The corn you have grown this year over and above what was wanted for home use must rot in the fields, foi we do not intend to allow you to sell it' ? Unless we are very much mistaken the farmers of America are not the men to stand such a fine as that. Even if they liked the notion of hurting England, they would not en- dure the thought that they were to pay the whole bill. Russia, no doubt, could inflict this fine on her peasants, but would she like to do it ? Remember it would mean that in two or three great provinces no taxes would be paid by the peasantry, and that trade generally would receive a terrible blow. People forget that trade is always reciprocal, and that if we should be injured by not being able to buy, other countries would suffer only less greatly by being unable to sell. Refusing to serve a customer who takes half his goods is not a proceeding which a tradesman ever finds agreeable. Depend upon it, Russian and American wheat will always find its way here unless and until we have an enemy strong enough to command the sea and to blockade our coasts. Then, no doubt, we shall be in danger of starvation, but not till then. We assume, of course, that the Power blockading would make bread-stuffs contraband of war. We must assume also that the United States would be at war with us, for, as Mr. Balfour said, if we did not have the United States against us, but, instead, had her insisting that bread- stuffs were not contraband of war, we need not worry. " The United States and we in alliance are strong enough to meet any conceivable combination, even if that combination should include all the rest of the civilised world." But in reality the question of contraband of war does not arise. If we were once to lose command of the sea, and could not prevent our coasts being blockaded, we should at once be invaded. The loss of our sea-power must as inevitably be followed by invasion as day by night. It is for this reason that all men who have minds to think with realise that it is absolutely essential for our existence as a nation to retain command of the sea.
But, it will perhaps be urged, we have missed a very important contingency. Suppose us to keep command of the sea, but suppose the enemy to possess so many fast cruisers that our commerce would be greatly impeded. Would not the result be that corn would rise to famine. prices ? We do not dread such a contingency in the least. All that our Government need do would be to insure every vessel against war risks,—that is, pay the value of every cargo and ship seized by the enemy. The actual amount which would have to be paid would probably not be very great, and yet the adverse influences on the price of corn would be counteracted. It would not be the cargoes actually lost that would run up the price of corn, but the huge premiums against war risks which would have to be paid. The whole question, then, comes back to this. If we keep command of the sea we are absolutely safe both from starvation and from invasion. If we forfeit the command of the sea we are lost. That is the fact which those who are worrying about our food-supplie, ild keep always before them. As long as we have the ships and the sailors not only does Britannia need no bulwarks and no guns along the steep, but also no public granaries and no 5s. duty on corn. As long as the band can play " Rule, Britannia ; Britannia rules the waves," without uttering a musical lie we need have no fear of seeing our people without bread to eat.
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